Technology Assessment in Japan and Europe by Moniz, Antonio & Okuwada, Kumi
T
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
y
 A
s
s
e
s
s
m
e
n
T
 i
n
 J
A
p
A
n
 A
n
d
 E
u
R
o
p
E
A
. 
M
o
n
iz
 &
 K
. 
o
k
u
w
a
d
a
T e c h n o lo gy  A s s e s s m e n T
i n  J a pa n  a n d  E u r o p E
A n t o n i o  M o n i z  &  K u m i  o k u w a d a

Antonio Moniz, Kumi Okuwada
Technology Assessment in Japan and Europe

Technology Assessment  
in Japan and Europe
by
Antonio Moniz
Kumi Okuwada
Print on Demand 2016
ISBN 978-3-7315-0429-0
DOI 10.5445/KSP/1000048740
This document – excluding the cover, pictures and graphs – is licensed 
under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 DE License  
(CC BY-SA 3.0 DE): http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/de/
The cover page is licensed under the Creative Commons  
Attribution-No Derivatives 3.0 DE License (CC BY-ND 3.0 DE): 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/de/
Impressum
Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)  
KIT Scientific Publishing 
Straße am Forum 2 
D-76131 Karlsruhe
KIT Scientific Publishing is a registered trademark of Karlsruhe  
Institute of Technology. Reprint using the book cover is not allowed. 
www.ksp.kit.edu


i 
Contents 
Contents .................................................................................................. i 
Figures ................................................................................................... iii 
Tables .................................................................................................... iv 
Foreword ................................................................................................ 1 
Preface .................................................................................................. 15 
Preface .................................................................................................. 17 
Preface .................................................................................................. 19 
Part I: Examples of TA and TA-like Activities:  
Country-Specific Views ...................................................................... 21 
Technology Assessment and Risk Governance:  
Challenges Ahead in Japan .............................................................. 23 
From Intermediary to Intermedia: Technology Assessment 
(TA) and Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) ................... 37 
Parliamentary TA: Lessons to Be Learned from the Established .... 57 
Technology Assessment in Non-PTA Countries: An Overview 
of Recent Developments in Europe ................................................. 75 
Joint Fact Finding: Bridging the Evidence Gaps  
in Decision Making ......................................................................... 89 
  
Contents 
ii 
Part II: TA under Pressure: A Challenge of 
Interdisciplinarity/Transdisciplinarity ........................................... 101 
Global Pressure – Local Transition: The German 
“Energiewende” as an Interdisciplinary Research Problem  
in the Helmholtz Alliance ENERGY-TRANS .............................. 103 
Implementing Technology Assessment through Stakeholder 
Platforms: Strategic Resource Logistics for Socially Robust 
Models of Sustainability Innovation ............................................. 129 
Technology Provider and Receiver Interactions:  
The Capability Threshold Concept and Its Application  
to Technology Assessment ............................................................ 147 
Technology Assessment Activity at the National Diet  
Library of Japan ............................................................................ 163 
Authors .............................................................................................. 180 
 
 
iii 
Figures 
Figure 1: IRGC’s risk governance process ....................................... 28 
Figure 1: Many disciplines related to the risks posed by 
radionuclides ..................................................................... 94 
Figure 2: Categorization of facts ....................................................... 95 
Figure 1: Technology-Transfer Effective Frontier .......................... 151 
Figure 2: Concept of Gap in UIL .................................................... 152 
Figure 3: Bridging path classifications ........................................... 153 
Figure 4: TA effective frontier framework ..................................... 157 
Figure 5: Stakeholders’ activities with innovator ........................... 159 
iv 
Tables 
Table 1: Overview of the educational program on TA ...................... 34 
Table 1: Three Generations of TA ..................................................... 42 
Table 1: List of topics of the Science and Technology Project, 
FY2010–2014 .................................................................... 171 
Table 2: Examples of legislation related to science and 
technology at the instance of Parliament members ............ 174 
 
 1 
Foreword 
António Moniz and Kumi Okuwada 
This book consists of the proceedings and related discussions of a 
workshop entitled “Technology Assessment: A Stable Solution or Only 
Relevant Under Pressure?,” which was held in Tokyo July 11, 2014. 
This workshop was jointly organized by KIT_ITAS (the Institute for 
Technology Assessment and Systems Analysis, of the Karlsruhe Insti-
tute of Science, in Germany) and JST_RISTEX (the Research Institute 
of Science and Technology for Society, of the Japan Science and Tech-
nology Agency) and also had the assistance of the University Nova 
Lisbon (Portugal). 
In the announcement of this international workshop,
1
 it was mentioned 
that the goal of technology assessment (TA) – which comprises one 
concept of interdisciplinary problem-oriented research, policy consulting 
(such as parliamentary TA), and public dialogue – is to lend support to 
society and policy making by promoting understanding of the problems 
related to the grand sociotechnical challenges of our time, as well as to 
assess the available options for managing them. Controversially, it could 
be useful to identify socially sound, “stable,” resilient, and practical 
ways to deal with these technological challenges. 
We can verify that many countries have shown interest in TA and TA-like 
activities since the 1970s (Vig and Paschen, 2000). This applies to the 
United States and the establishment of the Office for Technology Assess-
ment at the Congress, as well as subsequently to other agencies in Europe, 
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such as TAB (Germany), POST (UK), and OPECST (France). As Hennen 
and Ladikas emphasize, “TA had originally been conceptualised as a 
procedure of scientific policy consulting, i.e. essentially a process of 
communication between experts and decision-makers. TA aimed to 
broaden the knowledge base of policy decisions by comprehensively 
analysing the socio-economic preconditions as well as the possible social, 
economic and environmental impacts of the implementation of new 
technologies” (Hennen and Ladikas, 2009:41–42). However, from time to 
time, these activities feared for their continuation, implementation, and 
consideration in both science and technology research and political 
processes (e.g., the Office of Technology Assessment in the US, the DBT 
in Denmark, and the IST in Belgium). 
Currently, there seems to be an increasing demand in the European 
Union (EU) and in Japan for the ability to assess technologies. In 2011, 
the European Commission launched the PACITA project to support 
European countries in implementing and formalizing TA activities.
2
 The 
Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technolo-
gy (MEXT) established the SciREX program (Science for Redesigning 
Science, Technology and Innovation Policy) to start rethinking Japan's 
attitude toward science and technology and their impact on society,
3
 and 
RISTEX initiated a program on the Science of Science, Technology and 
Innovation Policy.
4
 
Many social issues have been discussed, such as the following exam-
ples: (a) the aging society, (b) global environmental change, and (c) the 
resilience of social systems. The Fukushima case created a push for 
more TA studies and the need for formal TA activity. For example, the 
National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent 
                                                                    
2 http://www.pacitaproject.eu/ 
3 http://www.jst.go.jp/crds/scirex/en/about/index.html 
4 http://www.ristex.jp/EN/examin/stipolicy/index.html 
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Investigation Commission (NAIIC) formalized TA activity with a direct 
connection with the national Parliament, but there is still no TA unit at 
the National Diet.
5
 As Koboyashi referes in this book at the last chapter, 
“to build collaboration with other TA-like activities in Japan, it is 
necessary to overcome major challenges. The most important one is that 
those in academic circles understand the characteristics of assistance 
provided for legislation and its difference from assistance given to 
administrative bodies” (p. 177). 
In spite these attempts at institutionalization TA should be an analytical 
approach that should address both the direct effects and the indirect 
influence of technology development in our society. Such effects and 
influence would appear both in their positive and their negative aspects 
in society. It should cover a wide range of factors exerting influence on 
aspects of economics, environment, ethics, law, and culture. 
The object of TA should essentially be the relationship between technolo-
gy and society. This shared understanding constitutes the basis of the 
collaboration between ITAS, which conducts research comprising multi-
faceted TA approaches on topics ranging from ethical factors to political 
ones, UNL, which promotes a PhD program on TA, and RISTEX, which 
promotes the social embedding of science and technology. 
Assessment to Identify an Unforeseen Big Crisis 
The emergence and quick diffusion of new scientific approaches and 
new technologies have brought about an increased diversity of objec-
tives in TA. Because of the complexity of the contemporary social 
system, social risk has also assumed diversified forms. In this book, 
                                                                    
5 See the article by Koboyashi in this book. 
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Taniguchi emphasizes the necessity of conducting assessment to identify 
an unforeseen crisis whose social impact would be extremely severe 
independent of its probability, such as the great east Japanese mega 
natural disasters and the Fukushima nuclear crisis. In this case, only a 
few stakeholders had recognized the risk. 
There was a large gap between their understanding of risk and that of 
most people. After this crisis occurred, most people expressed their 
surprise, using words such as “unprecedented” or “unpredictable,” 
despite having known of the previous such events in the world. Tanigu-
chi describes that, in order to bridge this gap, some risk governance 
framework is necessary to relate their understanding and political 
decision making (p. 23 and followings). 
Matsuo et al. describes that a process of joint fact-finding by the stake-
holders should have been required before any political decisions were 
made after the big crisis (p. 89 and followings). On the other hand, 
thinking of risk concerning natural resources, including the economic 
aspect, Yarime introduced their trial visualization of material flow as a 
possible TA tool (p. 129 and followings). 
After the crisis of March 11 (also known as 3.11) disclosures of risks have 
been more required in Japan. We have to look at availability and usability 
of them as preparedness measures. As Büscher mentions, it is increasingly 
apparent that the energy system transformation “poses socio-technical 
problems which require more than merely technical solutions. These 
socio-technical problems require, moreover, social solutions; both on the 
level of the energy system as a functional unit (of organizations, regimes 
and networks), as well as on the level of individual action” (p. 104). In this 
sense that would not be just a problem that only Japan would have to face. 
Many other societies with similar change processes have to deal with new 
risk management policies. 
Foreword 
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A Stable Solution? 
As the pace of societal change has accelerated, it has become more diffi-
cult for us to find a stable solution to societal issues. Our sense of ethics 
also varies with social change, as do the necessity and acceptability of a 
specific technology in society. Thinking in terms of contemporary TA, it 
seems necessary that innovation agencies prepare some tools for recogniz-
ing such chronological changes in society and in its relations with tech-
nology. The same applies to other actors and institutions. Policy advisors, 
academics, and legislators also need such tools. We may also have to 
prepare other tools for making real-time or on-time assessment. Globaliza-
tion requires us to think of diffusion to another areas and the impact on 
them and to undertake international comparisons. In this book, Yoshizawa 
describes his expectations for a new generation of TA, based on his 
review of world TA activities (p. 37 and followings). 
Especially, TA of highly advanced forms of technology requires as-
sumptions about the future society when they would be employed. This 
is the reason that foresight methodologies have begun showing some 
meaning in TA activities. Prior to the year 2000, attention was paid to 
technology roadmaps. Nowadays, however, foresight activities have 
become more important in thinking about the future of a society because 
in many cases the intended social situations would lead to the selection 
of new technologies (Yokoo and Okuwada, 2013). Germany and Japan 
are advanced countries that have developed many types of foresight 
tools. In current foresight activities, a back-casting type of thinking has 
been induced, reinforcing the existing forecasting type of methods. In 
this book, Kanou discussed a possible political simulation in a case of 
medical regulations. Simulation could be a useful tool in new type of TA 
that includes assumptions about future society. 
Technology Assessment in Japan and Europe 
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The Experience with TA in Japan and Europe 
In this workshop, the participants from Japan have emphasized the fact 
that the scope of TA discussion in Japan has historically been limited or 
trivialized. They have pointed out problems related to the fact that the 
widespread image of TA in Japan has differed from that found elsewhere. 
In Japan, the concept of TA is still very strongly associated with politics. 
This could have led to the fact that few Japanese researchers acknowledge 
to be pursuing the TA approach in their scientific activities. 
However, at this workshop Kobayashi reported on recent TA activity for 
the Diet in Japan, and this experience is reflected in his chapter in this 
book. In his chapter, he describes his experiences until starting his TA 
activity at the National Diet Library (p. 163 and followings). 
The articles from Scherz and Merz and from Boavida and Moniz present a 
different perspective. The first article is about established parliamentary 
TA institutions in Europe, based on the experiences and lessons described 
in the PACITA project (cf. Scherz and Merz, p. 57 and followings). The 
second reflects on some cases in countries where parliamentary TA has 
not yet been implemented but where TA activities have nevertheless taken 
place (see also Hennen and Nierling, 2014). Some similarities can be seen 
to the Japanese case (cf. 75 and followings). 
Recent Trends from the Japanese Project “Science 
of Science, Technology and Innovation Policy” 
Outside the discussions held at this workshop, the “Science of Science, 
Technology and Innovation Policy” program pays attention for other 
trends in related TA research. 
Foreword 
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Especially in some advanced countries that are in an unsound situation 
as far as national finances are concerned, an economic assessment has 
become regarded as being of increased importance in their recent inno-
vation policy. The total economic benefit to society now more strongly 
influences the receptivity for technology, which may often differ from 
the provider's point of view. TA would afresh be regarded as important 
to presume validity of R&D investment for new technologies. 
On the other hand, open data policy and big data have initiated a new era 
of assessment tools. Visualization and the capacity to reuse data have 
become more important features in assessments. For example, a large 
amount of disaster risk data has been accumulated in the aftermath of 
the 3.11 crisis in Japan and has been shown to the public as the geo-
graphic risk map. On the other hand, it should be mandatory that the 
results of R&D trials conducted with public funds are openly accessible 
as part of ensuring the accountability of public investments in advanced 
counties. TA tools should also transform such trials in the near future. 
Based on the recognition of these trends, the program “Science of 
Science, Technology and Innovation Policy” in Japan has been managed 
toward realizing an evidence-based policy-making process. This pro-
gram overlaps with the efforts to move toward a new era of TA. 
One can observe that the concern for TA and TA-like activities has 
developed in waves depending on country-specific political circum-
stances, current frictions within the sociotechnical system, or catastro-
phes or accidents such as in Chernobyl or Fukushima. The argument is 
that TA-like activities represent a social response to technological 
challenges. Whether institutionalized or not, the capacity to handle 
technological challenges does imply the attitude to make decision 
makers aware of alternatives and to maintain the scientific capacity to 
Technology Assessment in Japan and Europe 
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reflect on several options. It therefore appears relevant to understand the 
conditions that must be met to establish TA permanently. 
The organizers of the workshop invited researchers from Japan and 
Europe to reflect together on country-specific developments to identify 
the conditions that must be present to anchor TA in science, politics, 
and society: 
 What are the triggers and barriers to establishing TA? 
 Can technological accidents or disasters be more than the peak 
of a (TA) development? 
 Would simulation play a role in foresight for TA? 
 And what can countries with an established (parliamentary) TA 
learn from those countries that are currently institutionalising TA? 
The aim of the workshop is to learn about different cultural conditions that 
have promoted the formation of a reflexive science. How important are 
sustainability, social acceptability, public participation, and environmental 
compatibility in interdisciplinary fields of research such as energy, mobili-
ty, or health? Is there an understanding of issues relevant to TA? 
Foreword 
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European-Japanese Institutional 
Collaboration Around TA 
In Europe, the Institute for Technology Assessment and Systems Analysis 
(ITAS) of the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) is known as a 
center of excellence on technology assessment (Paschen, 2000: 101). Its 
members have investigated TA methods and surrounding topics for a long 
time and suggested new types of methodologies for TA from a neutral 
perspective. They have helped spread TA activities all over the world. 
According to the ITAS organizational objectives and mission, a specific 
type of research has been developed that is characterized as follows
6
: 
 Relevance for problems and practice: With its research, 
ITAS ties in with the need for consultation on the impact of 
science and technology. Knowledge is developed against the 
background of societal problems, discourse, and upcoming  
decisions on technology. 
 Relation to the future and reflexivity: As a basic principle, 
there is always a prospective aspect in the Institute's research 
since it deals with the future impact of human action and  
societal decisions. 
 Normativity and sustainability: ITAS approaches the prob-
lem of technology assessment with scientific means. Ethical 
criteria and the general principle of sustainable development 
provide a stable guideline. 
 Inter- and transdisciplinarity: The range of tasks of ITAS  
requires an interdisciplinary crossing of disciplinary borders and 
the transdisciplinary participation of stakeholders and citizens. 
                                                                    
6 http://www.itas.kit.edu/english/research.php 
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In Portugal, and in accordance with the strategy of developing interdisci-
plinary competitive research, the School of Sciences and Technology 
(FCT) of the University Nova Lisbon focuses on the training of future 
engineers and scientists, promoting teaching and research that may be 
competitive at all levels. Emphasis is given to the need for students to 
become aware of the significant role science and technology play in the 
creation and organization of European society. The interest and commit-
ment given to this area of intellectual inquiry by the School of Science and 
Technology closely follows those of reputed schools of engineering, such 
as MIT, Georgia Tech, the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, and the 
University of Twente, all of which include the critical area known as STS 
(science, technology, and society), offered to students during several 
stages of their learning cycles (Moniz, 2012). 
Consequently, the School of Sciences and Technology of the University 
Nova Lisbon has been a pioneer in terms of its educational vision, 
whether with respect to its undergraduate and master's level programs 
(several courses in the area of the sociology of technology and industrial 
sociology) or at the doctoral level (technology assessment). The doctoral 
program in technology assessment reflects a continuation of this two-
decades-long commitment by the School of Science and Technology 
(Moniz and Grunwald, 2009). 
The Research Institute of Science and Technology for Society (RIST-
EX) has pursued the societal embedding of science and technology 
supported the relevant research projects. It started a research program 
called “Science of Science, Technology and Innovation Policy” in 2011, 
aiming to realize a more strongly evidence-based policy process. Since 
studies for policy design had been undeveloped in Japan, the incubation 
of its culture and expansion of research communities are also objectives 
of this program. Therefore, TA is an essential research issue in the 
“Science of Science, Technology and Innovation Policy” program. 
Foreword 
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These institutions agreed to cooperate in holding this first international 
workshop at RISTEX in Tokyo in 2014.7 The subsequent step was 
publication of this book by KIT Scientific Publishing. The webpage 
announcing the event will be maintained by the University Nova Lisbon 
(UNL) for further joint activities. This has prepared the ground for new 
steps concerning TA. Meanwhile, in the frame of the European PACITA 
project on parliamentary technology assessment experiences throughout 
Europe, it was held the final conference in Berlin on February 2015. In 
that conference António Moniz, Go Yoshizawa and Michiel Van 
Oudheusden organized a session on “Technology Assessment in East 
Asia: Experiences and New Approaches” with the participation of some 
authors of this book. There they were underlying that “by placing the 
development in historical, sociological, and comparative perspective, the 
panel seeks to open a space for critical reflection on the potential, 
problems, and limitations of initiating TA in Asia and draw connections 
to science, technology and innovation governance processes in other 
knowledge based economies across the globe”. 
New steps can be developed in the near future by these institutions in 
such a way that collaborative activities and scientific research on TA 
could be conducted both in Japan and in Europe. The advanced training 
and exchange of experts can help expand TA capacity at a global level. 
Thus, we present to the reader this book containing the papers presented 
to this scientific dialogue to promote the mutual understanding of 
complex societies that are facing important new demands in terms of 
technological opportunities and societal changes. Such knowledge is 
beneficial to the scientific communities dealing with technology assess-
ment and policy advice in innovative contexts. 
                                                                    
7 http://www.ristex.jp/stipolicy/en/topics/20140711.html 
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Preface 
Armin Grunwald 
 
Technology Assessment (TA) has been invented and firstly practiced in 
the United Stated of America almost 50 years ago. Its very idea of 
establishing research-based policy advice on the use and consequences 
of the technological advance spread quickly among several countries in 
Europe but also to Japan. According to the different boundary conditions 
in the various countries with respect to technology governance, institu-
tionalization of science and technology policy, political traditions and 
the status of citizen participation different TA approaches and concepts 
were developed, and different institutions were created. The diversity of 
constellations led to a diversity of manifestations of TA. 
While this is a logical consequence of the very idea of TA it seems also 
necessary to develop a TA perspective beyond this diversity. Exchange 
and mutual learning on the various approaches and their achievements 
and limitations are essential for the international TA community to 
develop new ideas on concepts, methods and items, and to grow by 
attracting researchers from different disciplines and from regions all 
over the world. 
There have been contacts between TA researchers and practitioners from 
Europe and Japan for decades. This exchange of ideas already has 
contributed considerably to the emergence of an international TA 
community we are witnessing now. The book “Technology Assessment 
in Japan and Europe” is a further step to strengthen exchange and mutual 
Technology Assessment in Japan and Europe 
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learning between these two and quite important parts of the world.  I 
highly welcome this book as a major contribution to the TA communi-
ties of Japan and Europe but I also expect important signals beyond: on 
the way towards an international TA community. 
 17 
Preface 
Akira Morita 
 
Innovation policy is being considered ever more important in the world. 
As evidence for this policy making process has become more important, 
the research program “Science for Science, Technology and Innovation 
Policy” was started in Japan in 2011. 
In the summer of 2014, we held a workshop in Tokyo on technology 
assessment and related topics as a collaborative event between re-
searchers from ITAS and members of our project. Technology assess-
ment is regarded as comprehensive analysis of both the positive and 
the negative aspects associated with science or technology, including 
their secondary impact. 
Technology assistance research should be employed for wider topics in 
the economy, environment, ethics, institutions, civilization, and culture. 
The data, methods, and models created as the result of this research should 
be such that they can be embedded in real political processes. In this 
sense, technology assessment is one of the important features of Science 
for Science, Technology and Innovation Policy project. I regret that very 
few sociologists have been working on technology assessment in Japan. 
It is impossible to pursue technology assessment without a precise grasp 
of the social situation. The social system both in the EU and in Japan 
will undergo significant changes in the near future because of the inevi-
table transformations related to their population dynamics. The social 
Technology Assessment in Japan and Europe 
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implications of advanced technologies constitute a key facet to solving 
the social problems associated with such technology. Thinking of these 
future prospects, I feel that the chance for experts from ITAS at KIT and 
researchers from our Japanese program to hold collaborative discussions 
has been very meaningful. I hope that this book will help attract more 
people to participate in these discussions. 
 19 
Preface 
Shinichiro Izumi 
 
In the summer of 2014, a workshop was held on issues related to modern 
technology assessment under the collaboration of ITAS from KIT (Ger-
many), UNL (Portugal) and RISTEX. It is very meaningful that this book 
has been published as an output and record of the workshop. 
At the1st World Conference on Science held in Budapest, Hungary, in 
June, 1999, and sponsored jointly by UNESCO and ICSU, the Declara-
tion on Science and the Use of Scientific Knowledge (the Budapest 
Declaration) was issued with regard to what science and technology 
should be in the twenty-first century. 
According to the Declaration, in the future science and technology 
should not only produce knowledge but broaden its attention with regard 
to how to use it. The previous function of science for knowledge is thus 
augmented by three new functions, namely by science for peace, science 
for development, and science in society and science for society. 
The Japanese organization founded in 2001 and based on the spirit of 
science in society and science for society was the predecessor one of 
today's RISTEX. RISTEX is one of the divisions of the Japan Science 
and Technology Agency (JST). In contrast to the other divisions of JST, 
which primarily fund research and development based on knowledge 
from the natural sciences, RISTEX funds and manages research and 
development which directly address society. By operating and managing 
Technology Assessment in Japan and Europe 
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research and development program, RISTEX emphasizes that the results 
of this research and development are embedded in society. 
Needless to say, assessment of the impact of each new technology on 
society is a basic part of our discussion of the relationship between science 
and technology and society. In 2005, the predecessor of RISTEX had an 
introductory book on technology assessment issued by ITAS translated 
into Japanese for our intensive study. I believe that the collaboration with 
ITAS at this time constitutes an extension of this history. I am aware that 
the social aspects to be coped with – with the assistance of technology 
assessment – have been emerging and expanding rapidly as a result of the 
rapid development of ICT and medical technology. I therefore strongly 
hope that another opportunity for collaboration between ITAS and RISTEX 
will present itself in the near future. 
 21 
Part I 
Examples of TA and TA-like Activities: 
Country-Specific Views 
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Technology Assessment and Risk 
Governance: Challenges Ahead in Japan 
Taketoshi Taniguchi 
Introduction 
Today’s socioeconomic activities are becoming more interdependent in 
an increasingly interconnected complex world with rapid technological 
progress. Different forms of modern technology pose risks of a systemic 
nature, which typically spread over more than one country and more 
than one sector, and may have effects across nature, technology, and the 
social system. While these risks may be relatively low in frequency, they 
may have broad ramifications for human health, safety, and security, the 
environment, economic welfare, and the fabric of societies. Secondary 
and tertiary social or economic consequences, so-called “ripple ef-
fects,” are considered to be unintended or unforeseeable consequences in 
the eyes of the people or organization that causes the incident, on the 
other hand, to be unexpected consequences in the eyes of a victim. And 
it is easy for the interested party to be aware of the risks and benefits of 
science and technology, but not clear to almost all people in a complex 
society. These gaps in perception can create issues of societal risk of 
great complexity and ambiguity that may be hard to deal with. The Great 
East Japan mega-natural disasters and the Fukushima nuclear crisis have 
put this risk landscape of Japanese society into relief. 
This paper outlines the political situation surrounding nuclear power  
in Japan after the Fukushima nuclear disaster, and discusses the role of 
Technology Assessment in Japan and Europe 
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technology assessment in nuclear risk governance and some of the 
challenges ahead in Japan. 
Political Situation After the Fukushima 
Nuclear Disaster 
Already three years have passed since the shocking nuclear disaster at 
Fukushima. Severe accidents at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power 
station reignited public and political debates and led not only to a re-
examination of and improvements in the institutional framework and 
nuclear safety regulation but also to the revisiting of national policy for 
using nuclear energy both at home and abroad. Furthermore, multifaceted 
risks of a systemic nature have been emerging and re-emerging in the 
social, political, and economic domains because the use of nuclear power 
in our country has been tightly and complexly interconnected with and 
interdependent on socioeconomic activities and has also produced nested 
or collective interests everywhere as a result of lock-in phenomena. 
How, then, have the government and the utility companies dealt with 
these situations after the Fukushima accident? 
In the aftermath of the accident, one investigation committee on the 
Fukushima nuclear power plant accident has been established after 
another.8 All of four accident investigation reports were published by the 
middle of 2012 (RJIF2012, ICANPS2012, TEPCO2012, NAIIC2012). 
And the AESJ Committee (chaired by Prof. S. Tanaka) published its 
report in March, 2014 (AESJ2014). These investigation committees have 
                                                                    
8 Independent Commission (chaired by Prof. K. Kitazawa, April 2011), Government 
Committee (chaired by Prof. Y. Hatamura, May 2011), TEPCO’s Commission 
(chaired by M. Yamazaki, June 2011), National Diet Commission (chaired by Prof.  
K. Kurokawa, December 2011) 
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drawn a wide range of lessons and challenges from technical, organiza-
tional and institutional points of view through technical data analysis, 
hearings, interviews, and their examinations. 
In the light of strong public sentiment against nuclear power in the 
aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear crisis, of course, not only the gen-
eral public also the nuclear fraternity had high expectations of sweeping 
change. However, both the Government and the Diet approved a reform 
of the nuclear safety regulatory bodies in June, 2012, that does not 
reflect the findings and recommendations of the National Diet Commis-
sion’s final report. 
As for the safety enhancement of nuclear facilities, the installation of 
costly hardware such as a large-scale seawall and filtered venting system 
according to a new retrofitting rule is now in progress without any 
comprehensive risk assessment of their effectiveness. Dr. S. Tanaka, 
Chairman of Nuclear Regulation Authority, says, “We will be tireless in 
our efforts to improve our regulatory measures so that Japan’s nuclear 
regulation standards will be among the worlds highest”.9 And Dr. S. 
Matsuura, Chairman of the Japan Nuclear Safety Institute, on behalf of 
nuclear industry, also says, “We pursue the world’s highest level of 
safety”.10 Needless to say, the utility companies are primarily responsi-
ble for safety through voluntary and continuous improvements. Howev-
er, the societal perspectives and needs concerning nuclear safety have 
obviously changed somewhat. We should expand the horizon and take 
different contexts into consideration. It is important to more fully under-
stand nuclear safety from broader societal perspectives rather than 
merely from a technological viewpoint. This is one of the major lessons 
learned from the Fukushima accident. 
                                                                    
9 http://www.nsr.go.jp/english/e_nra/ 
10 http://www.genanshin.jp/english/association/establishment.html 
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Regarding the future nuclear energy policy, the Government by the then 
ruling Democratic Party of Japan established the Energy and Environ-
ment Council in the Cabinet Office in October, 2011, and adopted the 
Innovative Energy and Environment Strategy, including a nuclear phase-
out scenario, after expert meetings, public hearings, and a poll in Sep-
tember, 2012. A few months later, however, Japanese energy policy 
once more changed following a dramatic win by the LDP at the general 
election in December, 2012. 
The Abe government had not prepared itself for the new opportunities of 
dialogue and deliberation with stakeholders and citizens while some 
actors had radicalized their position. This has resulted in an increasing 
inability to conduct a rational dialogue, trapping our society in a vicious 
circle. There is no sign of the government organizing opportunities for 
inclusive dialogues even though public sentiment in the present situation 
is even becoming ambivalent to nuclear energy, perhaps because the 
gradually increasing adverse economic impact of the long-term shut-
down of all of Japan's nuclear power plants is materializing. The Abe 
government has rather rapidly changed the nuclear policy instituted by 
the Democratic Party following the Fukushima nuclear disaster. 
The role of the Atomic Energy Commission has been reviewed exten-
sively in both the Noda and Abe governments, and nuclear policy-
making and decision-making authority was then substantially transferred 
to the METI Agency of Natural Resources and Energy in June, 2014. 
Without any extensive discussion, nuclear power is now again posi-
tioned as a base-load power source in energy policy. 
Anyway, organizational and administrative reforms of nuclear policy 
and safety regulation, enforcement of more rigid nuclear safety stand-
ards, and technical countermeasures have only been implemented in the 
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last three years. And the National Diet has not yet considered any 
proposals by the Diet Investigation Commission. 
The Fukushima onsite management strategy is not going as planned due 
to underlying logistical problems such as financing and the workforce, 
and the offsite decontamination program has been substantially delayed 
because of a deadlock over the siting of the interim storage of wastes 
such as contaminated soil. The Abe government seems to be lurching 
toward restarting nuclear power plants in the context of its growth 
strategy. Thus, the nuclear crisis and its political consequences are 
continuing. Both our society and the nuclear-related organizations have 
scarcely tackled the task of learning the essential lessons from the 
Fukushima disaster. 
Many of the nuclear-related problems that we face can never be over-
come technologically, but rather they are more likely to be solved by 
changing  societal mechanisms to enable collaborative processes for, for 
example, generating knowledge making informed decisions. “The major 
risks are social,” but they are still poorly understood. Prof. Granger 
Morgan says, “Risk is a highly interdisciplinary phenomenon and it 
takes an integrated view from all of the different perspectives to get 
things right”.11 
Risk Governance Process 
The scope of risk governance is not restricted to the issue of risk alone, but 
embraces the justification of hazardous activities with the potential of 
becoming a major risk. Much of the time such justification is implicitly 
acknowledged, however, sometimes it is explicitly questioned by society. 
                                                                    
11 IRGC 2003-2013 Interviews with IRGC Academics, pp 15-18, 2014 
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After the Fukushima nuclear disaster, justification of the use of nuclear 
energy has been explicitly questioned by the society. The Fukushima 
disaster occurred not only as a result of the failure of risk management by 
both TEPCO and regulatory bodies but also of a failure of governance. 
The International Risk Governance Council defines risk governance as 
“the totality of actors, rules, conventions, processes and mechanisms 
concerned with how relevant risk information is collected, analyzed and 
communicated, and how management decisions are taken”.12 
Figure 1 shows the core of IRGC's risk governance framework (IRGC 
2008). This consists of two parts. One is the assessment sphere on the 
right side, and other is the risk-handling sphere on the left side. The 
framework builds upon the logical structure of four phases called pre-
assessment, appraisal, characterization and evaluation, and management. 
Communication plays the crucial role across all the phases. 
 
Figure 1: IRGC’s risk governance process 
                                                                    
12 IRGC, An Introduction to the IRGC Risk Governance Framework, 2008 
Risk Gov nanc Process   
Source: An Introduction to the IRGC Risk Governance Framework, 2008 
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Here, I focus on the assessment sphere, that is, knowledge generation 
and understanding, in relation to TA activity. Knowledge is needed to 
reduce complexity and uncertainty and to make ambiguity comprehensi-
ble. Understanding is also equally important. If knowledge exists but is 
not understood by decision makers, stakeholders, and the public, then 
risk governance becomes highly vulnerable. 
One of the distinctive features of this risk governance framework is the 
pre-assessment phase that consists of problem framing, early warning, 
screening, and scientific conventions. This task clarifies the various 
perspectives on a risk, defines the issue to be looked at, and forms the 
baseline for how a risk is assessed and managed. 
Socially problematic issues are “invisible risks”. A typical example 
would be BSE. We never look at this sort of risk unless you are ready to 
look at what is going on. In the case of risks with long-term latency or a 
creeping nature, it is essential whether or not one tries to look out for 
signals that are physical, verbal, or nonverbal in nature. For those who 
wish to conceal invisible risks, the start of risk appraisal may become 
fatal, and thus a main battlefield will move upstream of risk appraisal. 
Examples are: When, where, how, and by whom should the task of 
framing be carried out, and what sorts of problems and why should we 
label issues as risk problems. The determination of the 5W1H of pre-
assessment is therefore crucial and a truly societal issue. 
Risk appraisal is composed of both a scientific risk assessment and an 
assessment of concern. The implementation of concern assessment is 
also a distinctive feature of this governance framework. Social scien-
tists should play a key role in this task. What are the public’s concerns 
and perceptions? What is the social response to the risk? Is there a 
possibility of political mobilization or potential conflict? What role do 
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existing institutions, governance structures, and the media play in 
defining public concerns? 
Evidence-based risk characterization generates knowledge for making the 
necessary judgment on the tolerability or acceptability,  or both, of a risk 
and for balanced policy making. The evidence collected and summarized 
here goes beyond the classic natural scientific knowledge reservoir and 
includes economic and social science expertise. In the course of risk 
characterization, scientists are asked to design a multicriteria profile of the 
risk in question, make a judgment about the seriousness of the risk, and 
suggest potential options to deal with the risk. 
Role of Technology Assessment in 
Nuclear Risk Governance 
The I2TA project13 conducted by the University of Tokyo defines TA as 
the “institutions and practices which support problem-definition (agenda 
setting) or decision-making for the development of technology and 
society by anticipating societal impacts of emerging technologies that 
are difficult to be governed by conventional research, innovation and 
legal systems at an early stage of the technology development” 14. 
According to this working definition, TA activities can play two roles in 
the risk governance process. 
First, TA is able to basically fulfill the functions of framing problems 
and setting agendas, which are key roles of the pre-assessment task in 
the risk governance process, and get a broad picture of the potential of 
the technology concerned. Limited-scope TA has the function of bringing 
                                                                    
13 This is the acronym for the project Innovation and Institutionalization of Technology 
Assessment. See http://i2ta.org/english/english.html. 
14 http://i2ta.org/files/RS-SCJ_20080922.pdf 
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up societal issues and provides input to the societal discussion about the 
5W1H of pre-assessment. An important factor in limited-scope TA 
activity is stakeholder engagement. 
Second, full-scope TA activity is knowledge generation itself in the 
risk governance process. Scientific evidence of the multifaceted 
societal impact derived by risk appraisal and characterization by an 
interdisciplinary team of experts, that is, information providing a 
complete picture of what is known about risk and what is and may 
remain unknown, helps reach an informed societal judgment for 
managing risks of technology. The success of full-scope TA activity 
relies heavily on interdisciplinary collaboration. 
The tasks of risk governance should be continuous, so TA activities also 
should be done continuously at an appropriate stage of technology devel-
opment, and timely on the occasion of the discovery of relevant scientific 
knowledge or of changes in the socioeconomic-political context, or of 
both. It would lead to societal learning and adaptive risk management. 
Technology Assessment Today in Japan 
In the Symposium on the Openness of Science and Technology Policy 
Processes held at the University of Tokyo in March, 2010, it was em-
phasized that TA is a tool supporting decision making that makes it 
possible to visualize the multifaceted impact of the technology con-
cerned.15 In the 4th Science and Technology Basic Plan (2011–2015),16 
the Japanese government noted the reinforcement of the following 
points: first is to examine what TA should really be, second is to pro-
mote TA activities about emerging technologies associated with bio-
                                                                    
15 http://i2ta.org/files/L-all.pdf (in Japanese) 
16 http://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/kihonkeikaku/index4.html (in Japanese) 
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ethical issues, third is to develop activities to share the outcomes of TA 
with the public, and fourth is to exploit TA for building a broader 
consensus about improving nuclear safety. 
However, these steps have not yet been initiated. There is no sign that the 
government will have TA conducted for nuclear energy in the new socio 
economic-political context, although the Atomic Energy Commission 
pointed out the importance of TA in its statement dated December, 
2012.17 In addition, it seems that awareness of the benefits of TA is 
declining in discussions about the 5th Science and Technology Plan. 
In Japan, as a science and technology nation, the awareness and under-
standing of TA among politicians, policy makers, scientists, and engi-
neers as a whole are really insufficient and have hardly been altered 
even though Japan is a dynamically changing society. While promoting 
science, technology, and innovation policy as the growth strategy of the 
Abe government, the practical use of TA is not explicitly ranked as a 
prerequisite of R&D of an emerging technology. One of underlying 
problems that TA activities do not pervade throughout the science and 
technology policy arena may be that politicians and policy makers in our 
country are apt to make light of the assessment/evaluation activity while 
attaching great importance to discovery and production. 
Challenges Ahead in Japan 
The social trust toward nuclear energy has been seriously eroded in 
Japan. Before the Fukushima disaster, nuclear energy stakeholders had 
lacked an understanding for slow-moving societal changes and for 
citizens’ concerns and interests and many deficits can be observed in the 
                                                                    
17 http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/about/kettei/121225-1_e.pdf 
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risk governance process. Since Fukushima, a few deficits have been 
slightly corrected, but critical deficits continue in the status quo. It even 
seems that some deficits are getting worse (see the appendix). 
First, full-scope TA of nuclear energy is urgently needed to show the 
multifaceted societal impact and risk profile in order to provide legiti-
macy and restore trust. Second, the Council for Science and Technology 
Policy (CSTP) has adopted the Impulsing Paradigm Change through 
Disruptive Technologies (ImPACT) program.18 The aim of ImPACT is 
to create the disruptive innovation that, if realized, will bring about 
major changes in the state of industry and society and to promote high-
risk high-impact R&D. Five such themes have been identified. It is 
important to consider the obligation of TA to examine the technology 
candidates in the ImPACT program. 
TA is a manner of a science and technology nation. Third, interdiscipli-
nary communication and collaboration among social scientists and 
engineering professionals pose a big challenge. TA does not belong only 
to scientists and engineers. They have a role, but so do social scientists 
such as sociologists. Sociological insights are necessary inputs to deter-
mining policy for science, technology, and innovation. It seems, howev-
er, that technology is of no concern to Japanese sociologists as a whole 
and thus they are not very aware of TA activities, although the study of 
science, technology, and society (STS) in Japan has steadily developed 
in the past decade. 
Finally, the development and implementation of educational programs 
on TA at universities also constitute a big challenge in Japan. Since 
2010 the University of Tokyo has provided practical education in tech-
nology assessment at the Graduate School of Public Policy, as shown in 
                                                                    
18 http://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/sentan/kakushintekikenkyu/basicpolicy.pdf  
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Table 1. The aim of the lecture is to better understand TA in the context 
of public policy through case studies of emerging technologies. Partici-
pants are graduate students from Public Policy, Engineering, Science, 
Law and Politics, Interdisciplinary Information Studies, Medicine, and 
the Arts and Sciences. 
Table 1: Overview of the educational program on TA 
Contents during 
one semester 
(3 h/week * 14 
weeks) 
Lectures providing an overview of TA (history, overseas 
situation, methodology) 
Lectures on technologies subject to TA by experts 
(professors of UTokyo) 
Group works of TA (investigations, interviews, group 
discussions) 
Production of a TA report for a specific addressee 
Presentations of TA results 
Topics 
2014: VR and AR technologies, Space debris removal 
technology 
2010–13: Brain–machine interface, Self-driving car, 
Large-scale simulation technology, M2M, Regenerative 
medicine (cornea), Geo-engineering technology, Smart 
grid system (smart meter), Large-scale offshore wind 
farm, Partitioning & transmutation technology for MAs 
and LLFPs, Fuel cell vehicle, Deep ocean water utiliza-
tion technology, etc. 
Concluding Remarks 
Facing the unprecedented nuclear disaster, the words “unexpected” and 
“unforeseeable” flew about among diverse stakeholders. As mentioned 
before, these gaps in perception gave rise to societal risk issues of high 
complexity and ambiguity that may be hard to deal with. It is important 
to make an effort to reduce the number and impact of unexpected and/or 
unforeseeable consequences before the occurrence of an adverse event. 
A good understanding of risk cascading and its impact, accompanied by 
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the Fukushima nuclear disaster, certainly provides us with many valua-
ble implications for building a secure and resilient nation. 
TA could end up reducing the societal costs of introducing new technol-
ogy into our society, so we need to think in terms of anticipating what 
could occur and, very importantly, of creating feedback on this anticipa-
tion for the ongoing decision-making and policy processes. 
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From Intermediary to Intermedia: 
Technology Assessment (TA)  
and Responsible Research and 
Innovation (RRI) 
Go Yoshizawa 
Three Years After … 
In the afternoon of March 11, 2011, the RISTEX-funded project 
Innovation and Institutionalization of Technology Assessment in Japan 
(i2TA, 2007–2011) conducted a final public workshop in Roppongi, 
Tokyo. Within an hour of the start of the event, a strong earthquake 
suddenly rattled the old building and windows of the venue. Due to the 
number of aftershocks, the event was interrupted several times to 
evacuate participants. 
This Great East Japan Earthquake and the consequent nuclear accident 
in Fukushima pushed policy makers to suspend the cabinet approval of 
the 4th Science and Technology Basic Plan, which was supposed to be 
released by the end of March, 2011, as a quinquennial plan for national 
science and technology policy (FY2012–2016). Five months later, the 
Cabinet Office finally approved the Plan with the addition of a set of 
policies for reconstruction, including a policy to ‘promote technology 
assessment exercises on nuclear safety improvements in order to build a 
broad national consensus’. 
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What remains now three years after the end of the i2TA project and the 
start of the 4th Science and Technology Basic Plan? One of the main 
outputs of the i2TA project was the idea of ‘third generation TA’ (Yo-
shizawa, 2010), in which more collaborative, distributed governance is 
promoted. First, it would be good to now reconsider the the project's 
final evaluation in order to look back at this concept and examine the 
extent to which it has been put into practice. 
Third Generation TA 
To date, a variety of past TA activities and institutions have been cate-
gorized into two models, such as ‘conventional’ and ‘new’ (Smits, 
Leyten & Hertog, 1995) and ‘instrumental’ and ‘discursive’ (Petermann, 
2000). These models correspond roughly to the first generation and the 
second generation of TA as illustrated in the following. 
The first generation of TA (1G-TA) is symbolized by the US Congress 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), established in 1972. To conduct 
each exercise, the OTA set up an advisory committee consisting of a wide 
range of experts and stakeholders, and the OTA staff wrote a TA report 
utilizing issue networks with the committee members. Basically the OTA 
staff members, themselves experts, authored the report, the content of 
which is highly technical (Bimber, 1996; Whiteman, 1995). 
In the 1970s, TA attempted to perform an early warning function – to 
forecast and diminish any negative future impact of technology at an 
early stage. In the 1980s, when it had been generally recognized that 
technology is inherently accompanied by uncertainty and unpredictabil-
ity, TA became a means of strategic assessment, focusing on how 
technology can respond to political issues. In this generation, the whole 
issue network can be the addressee of TA products. However, the role of 
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the TA was primarily to report to Congress. OTA was located in the 
Congress as the sponsor and the client of TA activities. 1G-TA can 
therefore be labeled as being parliament-centered (see Table 1). 
The second generation of TA (2G-TA) is characterized by the focus on 
public debate and societal agenda-building, where the first generation 
tends to support policy making and decision making more directly. In this 
generation, it is not only experts who take a lead to complete the TA 
report; public participation has also been facilitated by the development of 
novel methods. This is particularly the case in the Netherlands and Den-
mark. Democracy guarantees the practice of a form of TA in which 
technology development is reconsidered through deliberation by selected 
citizens using their local knowledge. In other European countries, there 
are many TA exercises in which the concerned public is designated as the 
client or addressee. These exercises are often precautionary appraisals, a 
fact which invites the criticism that TA does not contribute to technologi-
cal innovation. Since the late 1980s, 2G-TA has typically been based in 
European TA organizations. They are not only situated in parliaments 
(UK, France, Germany, and EU). Other implementing bodies include 
administrative organizations (Denmark) and science academies (Nether-
lands, Switzerland, Austria) (Shiroyama et al., 2009). 
Participatory TA, as a key concept of 2G, essentially aims to make the 
assessment process more transparent and to encourage wider public 
debate and social learning (Joss & Bellucci, 2002). With a stronger 
emphasis on problem solving and participation, interactive TA stresses 
the importance of democracy by including all relevant stakeholders 
(Grin, van de Graaf & Hoppe, 1997). However, as it is a kind of social 
experiment carried out in a context as power-free as possible, interactive 
TA can neither replace nor fully play out these processes but rather it 
can influence them (Heiskanen, 2005). Either way, decision makers are 
likely to face a dilemma between a loss of legitimacy resulting from 
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insufficient public participation and the possibility of endless debate 
among irreconcilable parties (Genus and Coles, 2005). 
Now we come to the question of what constitutes the third generation 
of TA. This may entail a new form of governance. In network govern-
ance, participants themselves collectively govern the network as 
shared governance, or a sole network participant takes the role of 
leading the organization and governing the network. On the other 
hand, the network can be governed either by a mandate or by the 
members themselves with a network administrative organization 
(NAO). As a network broker coordinating and sustaining the network, 
the NAO may be a government entity or a nonprofit organization. As 
network members are called upon to collectively monitor the actions 
of the NAO leadership, trust across the network can be higher than 
lead organization governance (Provan & Kenis, 2008). 
Distributed governance entails a process of the dispersion of power 
within and over a wide variety of actors and groups in the economy, 
society, and polity toward localized decision making, in which the best 
learning experience in a context of rapid change can be achieved by 
decentralized and flexible organizations (Paquet, 1997). In distributed 
governance, the NAO as a core organization of the governance of 3G-
TA activities plays a more strategic role and becomes responsible for the 
distribution of actors and intelligence in the network. Whereas (network) 
governance often focuses only on human institutions, distributed gov-
ernance also pays attention to information and knowledge activities, as 
designed in the theoretical framework of strategic intelligence 
(Kuhlmann et al., 1999). Therefore, the organization does not always 
simply utilize human and intellectual resources already distributed in the 
network, but often intentionally distributes them. 
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Whereas 2G-TA has undertaken communication and participatory 
exercises in a rather rough framework involving experts such as scien-
tists and engineers as well as selected citizens, 3G-TA facilitates the 
active participation of intermediate actors between experts and the lay 
public, encompassing private manufacturers and retailers as intermediate 
consumers and users, workers, workers’ unions, industrial and business 
associations, nonprofit organizations, consumer groups, local govern-
ments, social scientists, and journalists. 
The legitimacy and credibility of TA practice is guaranteed, independent 
of the status of the participants or procedures such as their expertise or 
the democratic features that they intrinsically retain, but by societal 
verification on the basis of a process that is accountable to the public. 
Accordingly, the relevance of the process is to be examined by the 
participants themselves and revised constantly. The constituent partici-
pants, e.g., practitioners, sponsors, clients, and addressees, vary dynami-
cally under the distributed governance. 
The assessment aims not only to analyze the societal impact of technol-
ogy at a point in time in the future, but also to intervene in the on-going 
research and development of technology on a real-time basis. In this 
way, TA “constructs” both the technology and the TA process itself. 
This double construction can be framed as a part of the transition man-
agement that foresees and shifts the sociotechnological paradigm and 
regime. This kind of TA, known as constructive TA, started in a minor 
way in the late 1980s and is now (together with real-time TA) quite 
visible (Rip, Misa & Schot, 1995; Guston & Sarewitz, 2002). 
Moreover, there is another construction aspect in 3G-TA. As the i2TA 
project has demonstrated, such TA activities encourage the construction 
of institutions dedicated to TA by embedding the necessary functions 
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into society. This can also be framed in the multilevel perspective of 
technological transitions (Genus & Coles, 2008). 
Table 1: Three Generations of TA 
 First Generation Second Generation Third Generation 
Time Since 1970s Since 1990s Since 2000s 
Institutions Parliament-
centered 
(Government) 
Parliament-related 
(Governance) 
Collaborative 
(Distributed 
governance) 
Key partici-
pants 
Experts Selected citizens 
and key stakehold-
ers 
Intermediate 
actors as well as 
the general 
public 
Guarantee 
of legitimacy 
and credibil-
ity 
Expertise Democratic process Societal verifica-
tion 
Approach Early warning to 
Strategic 
Precautionary to 
Constructive 
Real-time and 
Communicative 
Methods Technical/Analytic Social/Deliberative Mixed (with 
information and 
network technol-
ogies) 
Resources Expert Local Existing 
Remnant of (i2)TA 
Apart from the deliberative poll introduced by the Democratic Party of 
Japan (DPJ) coalition government to stimulate public discussion on 
whether to withdraw from nuclear energy in 2012 (Mikami, 2014), the 
government has not yet performed any of the TA exercises on improving 
nuclear safety promised in the 4th Science and Technology Basic Plan. 
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What about the promises and our expectations? In i2TA, we proposed 
the following five options for the institutionalization of TA in Japan 
(i2TA, 2011): 
(1) Diet (Japanese Parliament), as a supportive function for the  
research and analysis unit of the Select Committee on Science, 
Technology and Innovation in the House of Representatives; 
(2) Government, as an independent TA unit under the Science, Tech-
nology and Innovation Strategy Headquarters, Cabinet Office; 
(3) Science Council of Japan, assuring a wide range of practition-
ers in the Young Academy Committee through the enhance-
ment of its administration. It could establish a TA unit; 
(4) Governmental Funding Frame: (a) a policy to frame a certain 
proportion of the government R&D investment for TA activities 
engaging with a variety of research institutions, universities, and 
nonprofit organizations; or (b) under the frame of the “Science 
for Science, Technology and Innovation” and the “Science and 
Technology Communication” programs, or as a part of the Social 
Return Unit in a large-scale R&D program; and, 
(5) R&D organizations, as a part of the unit for S&T diplomacy, 
science communication, and R&D strategy in the National  
Research and Development Organization integrating existing 
public R&D agencies. 
Looking back over the last three years, only one TA institution has been 
substantiated. This institution accords with option (4b) and is left as a 
sign of hope for 3G-TA where there is room for TA researchers and 
practitioners to exchange their knowledge and create a network of TA-
like activities through the “Science for RE-designing Science, Technol-
ogy and Innovation Policy (SciREX)” program. 
Technology Assessment in Japan and Europe 
44 
At a grass-roots level, in September 2010, some of the i2TA project 
members set up as the successor body to i2TA, the Technology Assess-
ment Research Demonstration Project in the Policy Alternative Research 
Institute (PARI) of the University of Tokyo. As a top-down initiative, in 
August, 2014, the National Graduate School for Policy Studies (GRIPS) 
established the Science, Technology and Innovation Policy Research 
Center under the frame of the SciREX program. 
These institutions are supposed to perform as a kind of intermediary 
providing a link between knowledge and policy, like parliamentary TA 
organizations in Europe, through which TA exercises are conducted and 
performed. However, when it becomes more difficult for such intermedi-
aries to survive in the modern sociopolitical context, as in the cases of the 
Danish Board of Technology (Horst, 2014) and the Flemish TA organiza-
tions (van Oudheusden & Yoshizawa, 2013), we may need to rethink the 
role of intermediaries in embedding TA functions in society. 
Rethinking the Role of Intermediaries 
There have been serious entangled academic discussions in the study of 
intermediaries, covering at least three concepts of ‘intermediary’. First, 
there are familiar discussions on the linkage between knowledge and the 
market or society in innovation and technology management studies, 
namely organizations which have been called ‘third parties’, ‘knowledge 
brokers’, and ‘boundary organizations’ to name a few (Howells, 2006). 
Secondly, some discussions focus on the intermediate agency in the 
financial flow from government agencies to research bodies as typified 
as Japanese public funding agencies, often found in the study of research 
policy (IFENG, 2011). 
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Corresponding to this, thirdly, there is an extensive literature in evalua-
tion studies focusing on the agencies dedicated to program management 
as the middle level of intervention, while assuming a stratified structure 
of policy, program, and project in the public intervention in research and 
innovation – though the stratification is often loose when various schol-
ars do not differentiate between project and program in management 
studies (Artto et al., 2009) and program and policy evaluation studies 
(e.g. Chen, 2005). In brief, discussions about organizations intermediate 
between (1) knowledge producers and market or society as knowledge 
users, (2) funders and beneficiaries, or (3) policy makers and project 
teams become intermingled between research and innovation studies, 
economics, science and technology studies, policy and evaluation 
studies, and organization and management studies. Given this, a work-
ing definition of intermediary is “an organization linking a spon-
sor/client and a producer/addressee, in order to produce, transfer, ex-
change or use knowledge for social public values” (Yoshizawa & 
Nishimura, 2013). 
It might be useful here to focus on boundary organizations as the most 
familiar concept of intermediary in science, technology, and society 
(STS) studies and public policy studies. The very simple understanding 
of boundary organizations (Guston, 1999, 2001; Cash, 2001) can be 
summarized in the following three essential points: 
(1) participation by researchers and policy makers; 
(2) coproduction of 'boundary objects'; and 
(3) accountability to both the research and policy communities 
As some say (O'Mahony & Bechky, 2008), the durable nature of bound-
ary organizations serves as a catalyst for delineating interests. However, 
in Japan and possibly in other countries as well, boundary organizations 
are always vulnerable. The reason is closely related to the reason why 
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TA has never become institutionalized in Japan over the last forty years. 
First of all, there is a general public distrust of intermediaries. There 
must be a holistic commitment to the intermediary from each standpoint. 
In particular, the research community tends to be closed and exclusive 
while asking community members to fully commit to research and other 
community activities and thus spreading the them-or-us mind-set. 
Furthermore, there is an implicit requirement of a reduction in the cost 
of the transaction from knowledge to policy. Although Japan is not a 
very technocratic society, the policy community usually follows the 
research community, reflecting the politics of consultation (Schwartz, 
1998). Through a great number of policy advisory councils in individual 
government ministries and agencies, prominent researchers can be 
content to directly participate in the policy process, as if they inde-
pendently exercised power and authority. However, policy makers often 
keep them under control. 
It appears that there is also organizational distrust of intermediaries 
from research communities in Japan. The governance of the research 
community has undergone little change during the past century, and 
this can be the real villain behind the unsuccessful history of the 
establishment of intermediaries including TA organizations. Japanese 
academic societies originally emerged and evolved with the establish-
ment of a national university to nurture technocrats and its alumni 
reunions in the nineteenth century. Although mostly funded and 
supported by public money, researchers have since been free from 
accountability and responsibility to society while also expecting 
respect of their academic autonomy. As a consequence, they have 
retained much power and influence over legislative and administrative 
bodies and are consequently likely to devalue intermediaries. 
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One important question on the concept of intermediaries is the relation-
ship between structure and agency, or the organization and individual. In 
the dynamic field of exchanging knowledge, individuals are no longer 
associated with a single organization. They constitute essential actors in 
interorganizational networks and collaboration by means of organiza-
tional improvisation and communities of practice. Surely 3G-TA can 
pose one attempt to broaden and open up TA (Ely, van Zwanenberg & 
Stirling, 2014), but I would rather emphasize three key figures towards 
more agent-based thinking. 
As emphasised elsewhere (Yoshizawa, 2012), individual cognition, 
connections, and commitments are fundamental in the dynamic and 
sustainable management of a malleable and vulnerable intermediary 
responsive to situations, contexts, and environments. 
Intermedia for TA and RRI 
Just as intermediary usually implies an organization in policy and man-
agement studies, this paper introduces the new term 'intermedia' as the 
media between agents to produce, transfer, exchange or use knowledge for 
social public values. The media do not only refer to intermediate organiza-
tions and individuals, but also to networks, communities, spaces, and mass 
media as well as to ambience and atmosphere. 
A conventional governance perspective is formalized, static, and restricted 
to organizational processes and networks, the decision-making in which is 
based on either libertarian individuals or authoritarian society. In the 
Japanese context, however, as represented by terms like seken (world-
between) and kuuki (air), people often never make a clear decision on an 
issue but rather deal with it in a tacit, ad hoc, and peer-pressured manner. 
Such intangible ambient media can also perform as intermedia. This is 
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particularly important when we need to go beyond discussions on respon-
sibility in research products or processes. Tidd and Bessant (2009) suggest 
another two core dimensions: "position innovation," i.e., changes in the 
context in which the products/services are introduced, and "paradigm 
innovation," i.e., changes in the underlying mental models which frame 
what the organization does. These two dimensions are the most novel and 
interesting types of innovation (Rowley, Baregheh & Sambrook, 2011), 
but it may be more difficult for someone to take responsibility for such 
intangible and unspecific activities. 
Changes in the context and the underlying mental models are far from 
easy. First of all, we may need to change our conventional mental 
models of the nexus between science and society, neither going to a 
positivist or technocratic end in which science linearly serves society, 
nor going to a constructivist or relativistic end in which science and 
society are indistinguishably coproduced with each other. It is tricky in 
that positivism is clothed even in a constructivist term like trans-science. 
Alvin Weinberg, one of the ancestors in science and technology studies, 
defined trans-scientific as for "questions which can be asked of science 
and yet which cannot be answered by science" (Weinberg, 1972: 209, 
emphasis in the original). In literal terms, the askers are always in society, 
and science always stands on the answerers' side. This asymmetric config-
uration can be more obvious in the practice of responsible research and 
innovation (RRI). In conventional discussions of the social responsibility 
of scientists, it is supposed that individual consequentialist moral scientists 
execute a social contract and perform their accountability to the whole of 
society. This one-to-many relation, however, seems to be quite the oppo-
site in reality. A great number of anonymous individuals spread through-
out society can collectively rush to the world of science at once and ask 
(or attack at times) a few named scientists. 
From Intermediary to Intermedia 
49 
At this stage, the targeted actors are not just the individual scientists but 
rather the science community as a whole, simply and unfortunately 
because most of the members of society are unaware and uninformed as to 
how the science community works and how there can be collaboration and 
conflict between different science tribes in disciplines, laboratories, 
schools, institutions, regions and nations under the name of science. 
Although an analogy to something serious that is happening in military 
affairs may not be very smart, this conflict between scientists and citizens 
can be seen as a kind of asymmetric warfare (cf. Hardt & Negri 2002). 
Under these circumstances, individual scientists find it hard to retain a 
Janus-faced responsibility – as an expert exhibiting scientific accounta-
bility on the one hand, and as a citizen showing general moral responsi-
bility to the public. It may be better that they remain scientific experts, 
but even more as 'experts who take a step forward' for society (RISTEX, 
2013). Showing considerable responsibility and responsiveness to 
society often exhausts scientists. Citizens may also have to improve their 
institutional perspective (rather than scientific literacy) in order to 
communicate better with the science community. To moderate scientists' 
responsiveness and weaken responsibility to the public, intermedia 
should play a critical mediating role. 
The Age of Intermedia 
One of the remaining agenda items is on how to dissolve or mitigate the 
asymmetric (epistemic) relationship between science and society. Open 
science may be a possible solution in the sense that citizens can participate 
in science and recognize how science works not only in nature but also in 
the scientific community. We can also expect public engagement to be a 
key for the dissolution. However, public involvement has recently been 
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criticized in terms of under-utilization in the policy-making process 
(Rogers-Hayden & Pidgeon, 2007; van Oudheusden, 2011; Rask, 2013). 
Apart from utility in policy, the engaged public is nonetheless unlikely 
to change its mind and understanding of the scientific community, if not 
of science itself. Public involvement seems to follow the same track of 
process innovation, in the sense that both believe that process change 
may bring good results for policy or the market regardless of the context 
(position) or the actors' mental models (paradigm). 
The responsible conduct of research (RCR) may have similar pitfalls, but 
it is strategically more feasible and reasonable to highlight this concept 
and practice as an entry point for good governance in research communi-
ties. Unlike public involvement, which is more focused on the nexus 
between public and government for policy making than the one between 
public and science, RCR is directed to science and focused on the reform 
of research communities. Keys to open up ways from RCR to RRI in 
Japan include working with research managers and administrators and, 
thereby, reform of universities and academic societies. The forty years of 
silence for the institutionalization of TA in Japan could be changed and a 
new history will come with the destruction of the ancient regime for 
research communities and structures. 
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Parliamentary TA: Lessons to  
Be Learned from the Established 
Constanze Scherz and Christina Merz 
Introduction 
Technology assessment (TA) serves several functions in several con-
texts. It is a concept of interdisciplinary (and increasingly also transdis-
ciplinary) research. Furthermore, TA can be regarded as problem-
oriented research and is therefore predestined to support policy makers 
by understanding the problems connected to the social-technical chal-
lenges of our time. By performing this function, the aim should be to 
assess the available options for managing them. But the question is: 
What are triggers and barriers to reaching this goal? 
In the following we refer to TA as a policy-consulting method in the 
field of parliamentary TA. First we ask how the institutionalization of 
parliamentary TA has taken place. In which countries and under which 
political and societal conditions have TA institutions been established? 
Afterwards we can clearly demonstrate the heterogeneity of the estab-
lished TA institutions: they follow different organizational models and 
types of association to parliament. Some of their histories can be told as 
successful stories, while others have failed and been closed. 
At a time when numerous initiatives all over the world are trying to 
institutionalize TA at a (national) parliament for the first time, it is also 
worth focusing on the established. The reasons are manifold. As role 
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models, the established institutions should time and again reflect on their 
own legitimacy and their current tasks. Are the formats they follow still 
sufficient to provide advice on time and appropriately regarding the 
complexities of our contemporary societies? This kind of reflection is 
not only helpful but a necessary condition for persisting. In the final 
section we will therefore refer to some new developments, formats, and 
networking activities, some of which have already started. They indicate 
that the established parliamentary TA institutions have already learned 
some of their lessons. 
Institutionalization in the US and Europe19 
The Cradle of TA: The Office of Technology Assessment 
Concepts of TA were already discussed in the United States in the late 
1960s “when tensions flared between executive and the congressional 
branches of the federal government about access to technical and scien-
tific advice” (Sadowski/Guston 2015:53). After years of debate about 
the conceivable methods and styles of advice, Congress created the 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in 1972 in order to assist and 
support the legislative “in the identification and consideration of existing 
and probable impacts of technological application [to ensure that] the 
consequences of technological applications be anticipated, understood, 
and considered in determination of public policy on existing and emerg-
ing national problems” (Blair 2013: Appendix). 
OTA was the first and largest parliamentary TA office, and its history 
has therefore often been studied (e.g., Bimber 1996, Guston 2003, 
                                                                    
19 Parts of the sub-chapters 1 and 2 were published in the journal Filosofija nauki i 
tehniki (Philosophy of Science and Technology), Russian Academy of Sciences, 2015, 
in review. 
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Keiper 2004). OTA’s original design was to provide a kind of “early 
warning” for the Congress on the potential impact of new and emerging 
kinds of technology. The first report addressed the viability of generic 
drugs.20 This report also included explicit policy recommendations, 
which was discontinued in the following reports due to “[…] the OTA 
legislation that required that assessment reports […] be approved by an 
affirming majority vote […]” (Blair 2013:451) of OTA’s Board, which 
was composed of Republican as well as Democratic members of the 
Congress. And this was not the only challenge OTA had to face. Among 
the studies, papers, and reports that OTA provided were a large number 
of comprehensive technology assessments “[…] which it produced and 
delivered to congressional committees upon formal request” (Sadowski 
2015:15). For this purpose, it established a detailed and extensive 
process to be able to include a variety of stakeholder perspectives on the 
specific topic of interest (see for example Blair 2013:452 et seq.). 
However, this attempt to include different opinions and thus provide 
neutral results to the Congress was not only a challenge in regard to the 
particular studies and assessments but also for OTA's self-perception 
and inner organization. The somehow ambivalent position in being an 
institution close to the legislative and having the Congress as main client 
on the one hand while on the other trying to establish itself as a neutral, 
somehow independent, institution led to processes of self-reflection. 
These processes were also accompanied by changes in OTA's leadership, 
and the different directors – the one more, the other less – stimulated self-
studying of OTA's work and the methods used when carrying out a TA 
study (see for example Guston 2001). In this sense, at least the inner-
organizational structure of OTA was never fully established before OTA 
                                                                    
20 OTA – Office of Technology Assessment (1974): Drug Bioequivalence,  
NTIS order #PB-244862, July 1974. Washington, DC; 
https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk3/1974/7401/7401.PDF  
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had to close its doors in 1995 after more than 20 years of operation. And 
when thinking about these attempts to handle the ambivalent situation of 
being neutral and having the Congress as its main client, it is a kind of 
irony of fate that OTA fell victim to political leadership. Although, on the 
other hand, one must admit that the neutral position and self-perception of 
OTA was judged ambivalently (see for example Bimber 1996) and 
Sadowski (2015:17) regards OTA as probably being “a challenger” to 
Republican goals and its closure as a response to it, in the end, the reasons 
for OTA's closing are not fully clear. Blair (2013:453), for example, points 
to OTA’s processes of self-perception when he mentions, among other 
reasons, “[…] the lack of a mission fully integrated with a well-
established congressional process […]”. 
Whatever the reasons that were attributed, there seems to be a consensus 
that OTA was an easy victim in times when the "Contract with America" 
was not only a big promise in regard to its content but also one that was 
directly linked to the pledge of implementing the promised reforms 
within 100 days. In this sense, the consolidation of the federal budget as 
one important campaign pledge of the Republicans and the Contract 
with America had cost OTA its right to exist. Interestingly, Guston 
(2001:11) comments on the closure of OTA as follows: “It is unclear 
whether it is necessary to agree on why OTA passed in order to agree on 
what, if anything, should replace it.” 
Parliamentary TA in Europe: The Established 
Institutions as Heterogeneous Role Models 
Whatever the lessons learned from the closure of OTA, the OTA served 
and still serves as a role model for others. Indeed, the same approach to 
institutionalize TA pursued in the United States was taken up by Euro-
pean parliamentary TA institutions founded in the 1980s and 1990s. But 
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what does this really mean for the institutionalization of TA in Europe 
or beyond? Indeed, several terms are often used when TA is described 
from the perspective of countries in which TA's role as a consultant and 
advisor on policy is regarded as settled. Even in the introduction of this 
article, we have used different adjectives, such as established, institu-
tionalized, and organized, in an indistinct manner. However, when 
trying to talk explicitly about the institutionalization of TA in this 
section, we must first of all clarify what we are talking about or at least 
indicate what we are not talking about. In the following, we will write 
about institutionalized TA in the sense of parliamentary TA. 
Though this term often leads to the conclusion that TA is directly 
included or connected to a parliament, it is important to notice that there 
are indeed several forms as to how parliamentary TA is performed 
within European countries and that these forms also differ from the OTA 
model in many respects, e.g., organizationally as well as with regard to 
their methodologies and mission (e.g., Vig/Paschen 2000). In 2012 
Ganzevles and van Est published a paper in the course of the EU-funded 
project Parliaments and Civil Society in Technology Assessment (PAC-
ITA)21 about TA practices in Europe. 
The authors point out in detail that “[…] one should be careful when 
equating or identifying performing Parliamentary TA with a Parliamen-
tary TA organisation. We therefore prefer to talk about a TA organisa-
tion that has the task to perform Parliamentary TA, possibly amongst 
performing other tasks” (Ganzevles/van Est 2012:21). And not only this, 
Ganzevles and van Est distinguish five organizational types of parlia-
mentary TA practice that are currently operational (2012:13-14): 
                                                                    
21 http://www.pacitaproject.eu/ 
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 Model 1 reflects mainly parliamentary involvement (Finland,22 
France,23 Greece,24, Italy25) 
 Model 2 reflects a shared parliament-science involvement (Cata-
lonia (Spain),26 European Union,27 Germany,28 the UK,29 and the 
USA30 (until 1995) 
 Model 3 entails a shared parliament-science-society involvement 
(Flanders (Belgium until 201231), Denmark (as of 2012)32) 
 Model 4 reflects a shared science-government involvement 
(Austria33) 
 Model 5 reflects a shared involvement of all four spheres:  
parliament-government-science-society (the Netherlands,34  
Norway,35 Switzerland,36 USA (for the GOA)37) 
                                                                    
22 The Committee for the Future, Finland; see 
http://web.eduskunta.fi/Resource.phx/parliament/committees/future.htx?lng=en  
23 L’Office parlementaire d’évaluation des choix scientifiques et technologiques 
(OPECST), France; see http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/commissions/ 
opecst-index.asp 
24 Greek Permanent Committee of Technology Assessment (GPCTA), Greek; see 
http://www.oeaw.ac.at/ita/fileadmin/epta/countryreport/greece.html 
25 Comitato per la Valutazione delle Scelte Scientifiche e Tecnologiche (VAST),  
Italy; see http://vast.camera.it/ 
26 El Consell Assessor del Parlament sobre Ciència i Tecnologia (CAPCIT),  
Catalonia (Spain); see http://www.parlament.cat/web/composicio/capcit 
27 Science and Technology Options Assessment (STOA), European Union; see 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/stoa/ 
28 Office of Technology Assessment at the German Bundestag (TAB), Germany; see 
http://www.tab-beim-bundestag.de/en/index.html 
29 Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST), UK; see 
http://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/offices/bicameral/post/  
30 Office of Technology Assessment (OTA); USA, see http://ota.fas.org/ (Archive) 
31 Instituut Samenleving en Technologie (IST), Flanders (Belgium), see 
http://www.oeaw.ac.at/ita/fileadmin/epta/countryreport/flanders.html 
32 Danish Board of Technology (DBT), Denmark; see 
http://www.oeaw.ac.at/ita/fileadmin/epta/countryreport/denmark.html 
33 Institute of Technology Assessment (ITA), Austria, see 
http://www.oeaw.ac.at/ita/en/home 
34 Rathenau Instituut, Netherlands, see http://www.rathenau.nl/en.html 
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This differentiation demonstrates that Parliamentary TA “[…] is mod-
eled as an activity at the interplay between parliament, government, 
science and society” (Ganzevles/van Est 2012:15). It is therefore im-
portant to consider that parliamentary TA has interlinkages to other 
societal institutions, or to express it in other words, parliamentary TA is 
always embedded in an “institutional environment” (Ganzevles/van Est 
2012:18). And of course, this also influences the forms in which parlia-
mentary TA is carried out and organized. 
As the institutional environment is on the one hand context specific (for 
example, based on country-specific, cultural, political and societal 
differences) and on the other hand changes over time, actors wanting to 
establish TA within their countries should become clear about the 
multidimensional nature of parliamentary TA. Furthermore, when 
looking at the countries that already have institutionalized forms of 
parliamentary TA, the establishment of TA can be regarded as a process. 
In the beginning, every institution in Europe had its own preconditions 
with regard to, for example, the drivers, the sponsors, the proposed 
decision-making processes (with regard to, e.g., the theme selection), the 
proposed addressees, the proposed main function, and the planned time 
perspective. And as the history shows, especially the latter, the lifespan 
of the institutions that advise on politics, depends on the political system 
on the one hand and the political will on the other. 
In dealing with these preconditions and by being captured in the 
existing “institutional environment” (Ganzevles/van Est 2012:18), 
every institution has had to undergo a process of learning or, even 
                                                                                                                                        
35 Norwegian Board of Technology (NBT), Norway, see 
http://teknologiradet.no/english/ 
36 Centre for Technology Assessment TA-Swiss, Switzerland, see 
https://www.ta-swiss.ch/en/ 
37 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), USA; see 
http://www.gao.gov/technology_assessment/key_reports 
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better, “institutional learning” (see Petermann/Scherz, 2005:283) 
where the organization had to learn to play its role, to develop its own 
structures, processes and rules. The organization figures out and at 
some point occupies “[…] the ‘manoeuvring space’ that [the particu-
lar] organisations [had] within their institutional context […]” (Gan-
zevles/van Est 2012:16). Therefore, the manner in which parliamen-
tary TA was institutionalized and the national-specific processes that 
had to be undergone enable the respective “[…] TA organization to 
have an impact on the political debate” (Ganzevles/van Est 2012:19). 
The Office of Technology Assessment at the 
German Bundestag: An Example for Establishing 
TA in a National Context 
As a basis for reflection and in order to illustrate how the above-
mentioned preconditions or processes looked in a specific case, in this 
section we will present the German example of TAB (the Office of 
Technology Assessment at the German Bundestag), which is operated 
by the Institute of Technology Assessment and Systems Analysis (ITAS 
at KIT). What were the reasons for institutionalizing TAB and, at the 
same time, for establishing TA in the political context in Germany? 
TA at the German Bundestag is stable connected with TAB. Like in 
other European states, the idea of providing continuous technology 
assessment in support of parliament dates back to the 1970s. In that 
decade the debate on the opportunities and risks of scientific and techno-
logical developments increased. Numerous problematic consequences 
for society and the environment raised the awareness in the German 
Bundestag of the need for an early assessment and evaluation of the 
development and use of technology. The parliamentarians debated the 
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opportunities, risks, and potentials of designing new forms of technolo-
gy. And the discussion soon focused on the question of whether and how 
TA might be used in support of decision-making processes. Concerning 
the question of institutionalization, the debate gained momentum in 
1973 with a motion by the (then opposition) Christian Democratic 
Union parliamentary group to establish an “Office for Evaluation of 
Technological Development at the German Bundestag”.38 
Numerous proposals from other parliamentary groups followed. In 1985 
there was a joint decision by the parliamentary groups set up the “Study 
Commission on Assessment and Evaluation of Technological Impacts”.39 
This Commission submitted a proposal on the “Institutionalization of an 
advisory body for technology assessment and evaluation at the German 
Bundestag” in 1986 and completed its work by the end of the electoral 
period with an interim report containing recommendations regarding the 
organization of technology assessment at the German Bundestag.40 
Following the next federal elections, the next Bundestag again set up a 
Study Commission on TA. Its task was to adopt the criticism of the 
institutionalization model. In its final report, the Commission presented 
three different models for discussion and decision: 
(4) The Christian Democratic Union and the Free Democratic 
Party suggested renaming the Committee on Research and 
Technology to “Committee on Research, Technology and Tech-
nology Assessment”, which would be responsible for the initia-
tion and political control of TA. An institution outside Parliament 
                                                                    
38 See Bundestagsdrucksache 7/468, April 16, 1973; 
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/07/004/0700468.pdf (downloaded 2015-03-12) 
39 See Bundestagsdrucksache 10/2937, February 27, 1985; 
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/10/029/1002937.pdf (downloaded 2015-03-12) 
40 See Bundestagsdrucksache 10/5844, July 14, 1986; 
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/10/058/1005844.pdf (downloaded 2015-03-12) 
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would be commissioned to conduct TA studies and carry out 
“this task with a high degree of independence and responsibil-
ity” (Deutscher Bundestag 1989:14 et seq.). 
(5) The Social Democratic Party proposed to establish a committee 
for parliamentary technology advice as well as a scientific unit 
(about 15 members) within the German Bundestag. The com-
mittee and the scientific unit should be supported by a “Board 
of Trustees” appointed by the German Bundestag (Deutscher 
Bundestag 1989:15 et seqq.). 
(6) The Green Party voted for the establishment of a TA foundation 
which would be headed by members of the German Bundestag 
and non-parliamentary experts to be elected by the General  
Assembly of parliament. Furthermore, an institute would be as-
signed to the foundation, whose task would be to accompany TA 
studies and prepare them for the Parliament. Additionally, a  
permanent scientific unit would be attached to the Presidium of 
the German Bundestag, which would award TA studies to the 
foundation (Deutscher Bundestag 1989:17 et seqq.). 
On November 16, 1989, the German Bundestag voted by majority of the 
Christian Democratic Union and the Free Democratic Party to rename 
the “Committee on Research and Technology” to “Committee on Re-
search, Technology and Technology Assessment” and to authorize a 
scientific institution to conduct TA for the German Bundestag.41 The 
German case shows that – despite their differences – all the parliamen-
tary groups agreed on the need for a permanent TA institution “inde-
pendent of elections and parliamentary cycles and supportive of the 
                                                                    
41 See Bundestagsdrucksache 11/5489, October 26, 1989; 
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/11/054/1105489.pdf (downloaded 2015-03-12) 
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Bundestag in its tasks as a legislative body, particularly when it came to 
shaping the conditions of scientific and technological change”.42 
Finally, on August 29, 1990, after long and intense debate on TA and its 
institutionalization, the German Bundestag signed the first contract with 
the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center for a three-year pilot phase. TAB 
was founded. Since then, it has been operated by the Institute for Tech-
nology Assessment and Systems Analysis (ITAS). After the conclusion 
of the pilot phase, the Bundestag decided on March 4, 1993, to establish 
a permanent advisory institution “Technology Assessment at the Ger-
man Bundestag”.4344 
The German TAB follows the organization model of “shared parlia-
ment-science involvement”. Its work focuses solely on the German 
Bundestag. During the 25 years of its existence, the number of commit-
tees initiating and debating TAB studies has grown (see e.g. Gan-
zevles/van Est 2012:105). Although the federal and state ministries as 
well as research institutions, government agencies, companies, and 
interested members of the public follow the work of TAB with interest, 
the main addressee and only client is still the parliament. However, the 
demands of parliament or specifically of the members of the committee 
                                                                    
42 See also “A brief history of the Office of Technology Assessment at the German 
Bundestag (TAB)” available on the TAB webpage  
http://www.tab-beim-bundestag.de/en/about-tab/history.html). 
43 See Bundestagsdrucksache 12/4193, January 22, 1993; 
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/12/041/1204193.pdf (download 2015-03-12) 
44 For the two following five-years-periods (until August 2003), the (then) Karlsruhe 
Research Center was commissioned to operate TAB on its own, and from September 
2003 till August 2013 it cooperated in accordance with a decision of the Committee 
for Research, Technology and Technology Assessment with the Fraunhofer Institute 
for Systems and Innovation Research (ISI), Karlsruhe. On February 27, 2013, the 
Committee decided after a call for applications to commission the Karlsruhe Institute 
of Technology (KIT) to again run TAB for another five-year period (running until 
August 31, 2018), on which it cooperates in specific areas with the Helmholtz Center 
for Environmental Research (UFZ), the Institute for Future Studies and Technology 
Assessment (IZT), and the VDI/VDE Innovation + Technik GmbH. 
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on Education, Research, and Technology Assessment have also 
changed. Every five years ITAS applies for confirmation to operate 
TAB (together with consortium partners). 
This recurring application process allows for the reconsideration of 
formats and methods. For example, over the years TAB has started to 
open to the public. From 2002 on, TAB and the committee have chosen 
several projects for organization of a public presentation of and debate 
on TAB reports to parliament with invited representatives from the 
media, research, industry, and civil society (see Ganzevles/van Est 
2011:106). The necessity to involve the public in political decision-
making processes is reflected from most existing TA institutions, – not 
merely in Germany. 
What Steps to Take in the Future? 
Challenges and Ways Forward for 
Parliamentary TA in Changing Societies 
Although the heterogeneity of the established parliamentary TA institu-
tions has often been described, it is still worth focusing on the changes 
within this apparently established structure. “The concept as well as the 
organization of TA took remarkably different forms in different countries” 
(Vig 2000:367), and therefore the associated changes differ too. But 
regardless of the model of institutionalization, the societal challenges to 
TA must respond are similar: citizens affected by new technologies are 
increasingly being asked and willing to be directly involved in processes 
of political decision making; stakeholders with their specific knowledge in 
specific fields of technology are becoming increasingly important for the 
responsible use of technology; and politicians seek to decide on a well 
advised basis. And “[…] this involves the outputs of TA being expressed 
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not as single, ostensibly definitive, results, but as plural and conditional 
reflections on whatever constitutes the most salient axes of sensitivity that 
emerge in the analysis” (Ely et al. 2015:61). 
One way to open up TA is currently being practiced in the German 
TAB. The experience gathered in the regions concerned with planned 
electricity lines showed that measures are needed to enable a construc-
tive dialogue to be conducted between local elected political representa-
tives and citizens. Against the background that infrastructure projects 
decided at the German federal level have to be implemented at the local 
level, and that this kind of implementation is conflictual if it is just 
arranged top down, a TAB project should create a “solid basis in order 
that public discussion and participation procedures can be performed on 
an equal footing and – hopefully – with results that can be supported by 
all relevant stakeholders”.45 Involving the public has to be seen as a 
challenge, especially if it becomes part of the parliamentary process of 
consultation. Most of the European national parliaments strive for a long 
time to involve the public better and to increase the transparency of their 
work. And if it is true that the parliament as a whole and the parliamen-
tary opposition in particular have the ability to contact citizens, groups, 
and other state institutions, in particular the government and the ministe-
rial bureaucracy, then it is worthwhile for us to focus explicitly on the 
use of this communicative value (see also Herzog 1993:28). 
Considering that TA analyses have to meet scientific standards and should 
provide recommendations for policy decision making, which implies an 
inherent need to include nonscientific knowledge as well, a specific 
challenge is visible. Apart from this, TA needs to be flexible with regard 
to sudden problems and current frictions within the sociotechnical system 
                                                                    
45 Further information about the project “Balance of interests in infrastructure projects: 
Options for action with regard to local communication and organization” can be found on 
the web page http://www.tab-beim-bundestag.de/en/research/u10500.html (2015-3-16) 
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(e.g., accidents, environmental disasters). But in addition, TA attempts to 
function as a stable concept that provides knowledge for decision making 
based on the long-term perspective of influencing societal systems. 
Therefore, reflection on the particular disciplinary level with regard to 
these social systems also needs to be fulfilled. Having this in mind, it 
becomes clear that “pure” formalization of TA cannot end the debate 
about TA, its functions, and its development. 
Another challenge to be mentioned is one of the results of the PACITA 
project which compared the political and societal conditions in countries 
which already have established parliamentary TA with those countries 
which do not. One of the findings was that TA almost always had a 
chance in countries where strong R&D infrastructures formed the basis 
of quite well developed economies and public welfare. But as the 
economic pressures increase even in these countries with established 
TA-infrastructures and as globalization strengthens the necessity to find 
appropriate responses to the challenges of our time, even in these coun-
tries TA is being asked to provide support for identifying “[…] socially 
sound and robust country specific innovation pathways (‘constructive 
TA’) and contribute to lower costs of trial and error learning” (Hen-
nen/Nierling 2013:20). A joint European (or even international) TA 
network could function as an umbrella for both the established and the 
emerging TA institutions and national activities. Ideally, such a network 
will stabilize emerging TA activities by giving the national efforts an 
international frame, and the established TA institutions would be chal-
lenged to react to new demands by also learning from the new ones. 
In order to strengthen a common identity, TA activities and the TA 
community should become international. Prototype activities such as 
joint projects with partners from several countries could be a produc-
tive starting point toward internationalization. “Joint work on TA-
projects seems to be especially promising in this respect as it allows 
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not only for the development of a shared problem orientation and an 
exchange and reflection on methodological approaches, but also for a 
cross-national analysis of specific questions in the field of science and 
technology” (Hennen/Nierling 2013:21). And international confer-
ences offer a specific type of interaction and exchange within the 
heterogeneous TA community, too. 
At the Berlin PACITA conference46 in February, 2015, for example, not 
only scientists, but also stakeholders and politicians were invited to 
speak. The community realizes more and more that such formats help 
prepare one for embarking on complex challenges. The main aim of the 
conference was to offer contemporary formats of mutual learning and 
professional mobilization and combine TA-relevant activities such as 
risk communication, foresight, and policy analysis. “Especially, in the 
light of today’s pressing challenges, it seems essential to provide spaces 
for ‘discourse’ of TA. Being a problem-oriented approach, TA needs 
areas of exchange and ‘identity-shaping’ particularly where its institu-
tionalization is still unclear.” (Scherz/Hahn 2015:19) 
Our paper has examined the lessons that can be learned from the estab-
lished TA institutions. While discussing what “established” means, one 
becomes aware that the established parliamentary TA institutions in 
Europe must stay vivid to reflect societal challenges and retain the 
ability to react institutionally. 
  
                                                                    
46 http://berlinconference.pacitaproject.eu/  
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Technology Assessment in  
Non-PTA Countries: An Overview of  
Recent Developments in Europe 
Nuno Boavida and Antonio B. Moniz 
Introduction 
Despite recent activities to promote parliamentary technology assess-
ment (PTA), there has not been a concrete increase in the number of 
these institutions in the West. PTA can be understood as an effort to 
mediate between science and politics and their knowledge claims 
(Ganzevles, van Est, and Nentwich 2014). In fact, PTA acts as an agent 
that mediates between two different processes (i.e., policy and science) 
when they can interact. This work aims to describe the latest develop-
ments in European countries or regions that lack a structure to develop 
PTA activities (named non-PTA). They are countries or regions where 
parliamentary-oriented TA activities have not yet resulted in a formal 
structure, but where TA-related activities can be detected to some 
extent. This chapter will concentrate on activities in Portugal, Wallonia, 
and other Central and Eastern countries such as the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Lithuania and Bulgaria. Catalonia is mentioned as a 
specific case where a formal PTA structure exists but the way it is 
organized and financed is similar to the national and regional experienc-
es at the non-PTA countries. 
The focus on European non-PTA countries can provide clues for observ-
ing other developments in other parts of the world by emphasizing local 
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developments. In fact, although the history of TA in Europe shows that 
it is possible to identify overall trends toward the establishment of TA, 
their local contexts might be more decisive for understanding the possi-
ble emergence of structures related to TA (Ganzevles, van Est, and 
Nentwich 2014). 
Recently, a new collection of texts was published47 concerning the 
historical paths of TA and the new efforts to institutionalize it in several 
countries around the world. The texts mostly addressed the different 
forms of TA that have developed and are developing Europe, in an effort 
to explain the external and internal contexts that might allow the launch 
of TA in some countries and regions. Most of this research was an 
outcome of the PACITA project whose aim was to stimulate reflection 
in regions and countries with established PTA organizations as well as 
in other European states with an interest in PTA. This paper is signifi-
cantly based on these research outputs. 
These issues can be of interest to those in the TA-related community and 
policy makers in Japan (and other East Asian regions) who do not have a 
formalized PTA system. The discussions and attempts being made in 
some European countries can give some indication of the challenges and 
possibilities for the institutional formalization of TA. 
This paper argues that there are some elements of proximity in PTA 
between European countries and Japan. For example, Ganzevles, van Est 
and Nentwich (2014) write that a “number of scholars have looked for 
relationships among the arrival of different concepts for (parliamentary) 
TA in various countries and regions”. The authors also mention that 
Meyer (1999) argues that PTA has broadened from an expert-based, 
                                                                    
47 The texts were published in English in the journal Technikfolgenabschätzung – 
Theorie und Praxis (2015, 24, 1). 
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parliament-oriented concept in the USA to concepts in Europe that have 
opened up to industry, other stakeholders, and the public at large. 
Other authors such as Delvenne, Fallon, and Brunet (2011) suggest that 
PTA is evolving on an “overall reﬂexivity pathway”, “on which some 
PTAs have moved farther than others”. Furthermore, Ganzevles, van Est 
and Nentwich assert that “in this pathway, PTA has moved away from a 
mainly analytical activity that is ‘aimed at providing decision-makers 
with an objective analysis of the effects of technology on political 
agenda, decision-making processes and society as a whole’, and has 
opened up more to plurality and uncertainty, thereby ‘acknowledging 
and responding to the limitations of modern traditions’” (Ganzevles, van 
Est and Nentwich, 2014: 298). 
In the same way, the academic and political debate in Japan on the 
technology assessment options reveals similar elements about how to 
improve PTA activities. For example, Shiroyama et al. (2009: 5) points 
out that one of the problems of TA activities in Japan is its limited 
effectiveness with narrowly conceived feedback channels. The authors 
point to the need to pursue broader ways of communicating the TA 
results, such as identifying issues and setting the agenda (Shiroyama et 
al., 2009: 5).It therefore seems that the proximity between these coun-
tries is greater than the differences that separate them. In the following 
pages we will try to demonstrate this issue by considering some of the 
elements of European reality and experience. 
Regional Processes of Institutionalization: 
The Cases of Catalonia and Wallonia 
There are important European developments at the regional level. In fact, 
there is a success story in the Catalonia autonomous community of Spain, 
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which has developed different formats for more than a decade. In 1999, 
the Catalan government created CACIT, an Advisory Commission on 
Science and Technology; in 2003, the Parliament urged the government to 
formally link CACIT to the Catalan Parliament; in 2008, CAPCIT48 was 
formally established and started to function closer to a shared parliament-
science model; and in 2009, CAPCIT became member of EPTA49 (Böhle 
and Moniz 2015). Presently, CAPCIT can be seen as a “forum” composed 
of 10 parliamentarians and 10 representatives of the main scientific 
institutions of the region, producing reports and advice with no staff or 
budget (Böhle and Moniz 2015). 
There has been another significant development in the TA landscape at 
the regional level. In fact, there is an emerging case of institutionaliza-
tion of TA in the Wallonia region of the Belgium federation. The con-
text is related to the development of STI policies in the region over the 
last fifteen years, which have become a basis of Walloon regional policy 
making, according to Delvenne et al. (2015). These developments were 
accompanied by an increase of interest in TA in regional governing 
bodies and with policy makers. Furthermore, TA activities gained 
momentum in Wallonia from the interaction between the University of 
Liège and regional representatives. These efforts led to a proposal for a 
parliamentary decree to create a TA institute linked to the parliament 
(Delvenne et al. 2015). 
                                                                    
48 CAPCIT is the acronym for the Advisory Board of the Parliament of Catalonia for 
Science and Technology. 
49 According to Böhle and Moniz (2015), CAPCIT is a mixed body composed by 20 
members, half of them representing MPs and the other half the main scientific and 
technical institutions of Catalonia. “All the political parties are represented in this 
group, to which two members of the Presiding Board and the President of the Parlia-
ment – who is also the president of this mixed body – belong” (Böhle and Moniz 
2015, 30). 
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A few years later, in May, 2011, two regional ministers announced a 
joint initiative to create a Walloon Institute of Technology Assessment. 
It emphasized the institute’s role in policy making and in stimulating 
societal debate, its independence and location within the regional par-
liament, and its reliance on a network of experts and participatory 
methods, according to the authors. However, the creation of the institute 
was blocked by different conceptions of the Wallonia future: the TA 
institute should either work exclusively for the Walloon region (parlia-
ment and government) or also include the French community (e.g., the 
Brussels Capital Region) (see Delvenne et al. 2015). 
At present, an approved parliamentary decree to solve the blockage 
“remains in the limbo of the legislative process” (Delvenne et al., 2015: 
22). Also Hennen and Nierling (2014), referring to the TA activities in 
Wallonia, note this region already has a history of debate in its political 
system. Based on the study of Delvenne et al. (2012), they emphasize 
that there have been several initiatives in this region to set up TA capaci-
ties related to the government and the parliament. Just at the very mo-
ment when the research activities started, the decision to set up a TA 
institute was taken officially. Parliament and government are mentioned 
as the main addressees, but there is a lively political debate on the polity 
a TA institute should address: the Walloon region or the Wallonia–
Brussels Federation. 
The Portuguese Social Dynamic 
The first initiatives to install a body providing scientific advice for 
science policy in Portugal date back to the 1960s, still during the dicta-
torship. In the early part of the decade, a special office was established 
to carry out assessment studies and economic studies to support the 
yearly national budget and the four year planning, named GEBEI 
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(Portuguese Office for Basic Studies on Industrial Economy, at the 
Ministry of Finance and Planning). In the end of the decade, the Nation-
al Board of Scientific and Technological Research (JNICT) is created. 
Its mission was to plan, coordinate, and stimulate S&T research and to 
advise the government on national science policy. 
Later, in the late 1980s, JNICT assumed the tasks of developing the 
national S&T system, sponsored the large national laboratories, and 
created a larger scientific community and new research centers (Böhle 
and Moniz 2015). JNICT managed a national program to support 
economically productive structures (co-financed by the structural funds 
from the European Community) and was responsible for research and 
publication of many studies on sectors, regions, and cases (Böhle and 
Moniz 2015). In the late 1980s, TA-like activities were mainly being 
carried out by the public sector (Gonçalves and João Caraça 1987). 
TA-related activities continued to exist in different forms during the 
1990s, when Portuguese experts and social scientists were involved in 
different European initiatives (Böhle and Moniz 2015). Furthermore, in 
the later part of this decade, TA activities were significantly influenced 
by the debate about the location of facilities to co-incinerate dangerous 
substances. During discussions about the danger posed to populations, 
the visible differences between scientists created a public perception of 
uncertainty and controversy (Alves 2011). 
The debates were polarized and significantly adversarial, involving the 
affected populations, parliamentarians, members of government, and 
scientists. Overall, the debate led to an unprecedented shift in the role 
played by scientific commissions: their role moved from providing 
advice to exercising real decision-making power, in some matters 
leaving scientists to make decisions about political action, according  
to the authors. Since then, there has been a growing effort to ensure the 
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independence of scientific committees and their members (Alves 2011). 
The dispute about co-incineration was long and marked by the “Not In 
My Back Yard” syndrome (Alves 2011). In fact, in 2014 the decision 
was still being questioned by a local group in the Constitutional Court.50 
In addition, there were other important cases of public unrest with 
science, such as the threat of a H1N1 pandemic, the location of a third 
bridge across the Tagus River outfall, the location of the new airport in 
the Lisbon area, the plans for the high-speed railway, and recently a 
national legionella outbreak. These cases led to different solutions and 
sometimes involved loud public controversies between actors and 
stakeholders. Overall, the different solutions that were implemented 
contributed to an increase in the public's perception that scientific 
uncertainties and controversies relevant to policy making should be 
mediated by neutral actors. 
The future developments in the national panorama of TA are still uncer-
tain. On one hand, there are important national limitations to further TA 
developments. In fact, analysts mentioned the adverse impact of the 
insufficient involvement of stakeholders in decisions, the lack of a sound 
public opinion, the disconnect between the S&T system from economic 
structures, and the limited interactions between relevant ministries 
(Böhle and Moniz 2015). On the other hand, the combination of four 
interlinked dynamics provides room for more optimism. First, there are 
several PhD projects under development and preparing practitioners to 
deal with TA issues. In fact, the launching of a PhD program on TA at 
the University Nova Lisbon in 2009/10 created space to develop 20 
research projects around TA issues in the country and generated a 
significant social dynamic around the topic. The research programs 
                                                                    
50 “Co-Incineração de Resíduos Em Souselas No Tribunal Constitucional.” Lusa. 
17/01/2014. 
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cover topics from health TA studies, mobility and transport, brain-
computer interfaces, innovation and STS, and cloud computing (Böhle 
and Moniz 2015). 
Second, a national TA network named GrEAT exists since 2010 dissem-
inating information and promoting regular contacts with other STS 
experts in Portugal. The network has been strengthened not only by an 
internal dynamic supported in the PhD program, but also by its in-
volvement in parliament since 2010 and by its acceptance as an EPTA51 
observer institution in 2013. 
Third, there is a consistent dynamic in the national parliament, rooted in 
the Commission for Education, Science and Culture. In 2009, parliament 
recognized the need to develop activities towards the development of 
PTA.52 A report in 2013 suggested a proposal that failed to implement a 
TA unit inside the parliament.53 The reasons for this failure are still 
unclear. Böhle and Moniz (2015) suggested that the failure rested on the 
lack of financial resources or in the organizational maladjustment of this 
unit, but a lack of consensus about the proposal is also conceivable. 
Nevertheless, recognition of the need for PTA led in 2014 to a series of 
hearings about the possible formats of the TA unit and PTA functions in 
parliament.54, 55 At the present, several proposals are under discussion in 
parliament and GrEAT is contributing to overcoming the blockage 
                                                                    
51 EPTA is the acronym of the network for European Parliamentary Technology 
Assessment. 
52 Resolução da Assembleia da República No. 60/2009 – Aprofundamento das 
Actividades da Assembleia da República nas Áreas da Ciência e Tecnologia.  
Lisboa: Assembleia da República. 
53 “Relatório Final – Avaliação Tecnológica Parlamentar.” Comissão de Educação, 
Ciência e Cultura. 2013. Lisboa: Assembleia da República. 
http://avaliacaotecnologia.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/relatorio-rui-santos.pdf. 
54 “Ata Número 178/XII/3a SL 19 Fevereiro 2014 – 10h00.” Comissão de Educação, 
Ciência e Cultura. Lisboa: Assembleia da República. 
55 “Ata Número 182/XII/3a SL 11 Março 2014 – 15h00.” Comissão de Educação, 
Ciência e Cultura. Lisboa: Assembleia da República. 
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created in 2013 (Böhle and Moniz 2015). Fourth, there is a favorable 
external context where academic cooperation (particularly with 
ITAS/KIT56), European projects, and the EPTA network play a major 
role. The cooperation with ITAS/KIT has anchored strong scientific 
capabilities to the PhD program. For example, the support from 
ITAS/KIT allowed not just the development of several PhD theses, but 
also recent visits to Japan that helped to cement relations, exchange 
ideas, and launch this present book, among other activities. 
The European projects have provided a framework to establish im-
portant international scientific and policy contacts. Lastly, the EPTA 
network allowed the recognition of GrEAT as a player in the national 
and international TA panorama, recognizing the network as a valid 
player in PTA debates in Europe. In sum, the context in Portugal com-
bines adverse conditions with a significant social dynamic aiming to 
promote more TA activities in the country. Stronger TA activities are 
expected in the near future, as more PhD theses are discussed and these 
professionals play a role in the labor market. 
Other Eastern and Central European Countries 
TA is widely unknown in some Central and Eastern European countries. 
A possible explanation for this ignorance can be linked to the public’s 
perception of science. In fact, science in Eastern countries served for a 
long time as an instrument of political propaganda, where scientists were 
ordered to create evidence to support the Soviet political regime 
(Leichteris 2015). Thus, it is not surprising that science-based policy 
                                                                    
56 ITAS/KIT is the acronym of the Institute for Technology Assessment and System 
Analysis at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology. 
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advice is an area regarded with suspicion by the general public in these 
countries, according to Leichteris. 
Furthermore, other problems for TA activity are related to a lack of 
understanding of the concept, the inflexibility of the current system, the 
danger of a politicization of such attempts, the concentration of deci-
sions in the government rather than in the parliaments, and the lack of 
financing and skills (Leichteris 2015). However, there are some positive 
trends in these countries. In fact, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland have had some experience in activities similar to TA, especially 
in technology foresight (Michalek et al. 2014; Leichteris 2015). The 
Czech Republic also revealed signals in health TA practice, which is 
starting to appear in Czech universities (Michalek et al. 2014). 
Lithuania and Bulgaria were described as in transition towards problem-
oriented research and interdisciplinary research (Leichteris 2015). Their 
TA-like activities often rely on consultancy work done by private 
companies, and is usually initiated by measures of the European Union 
or the OECD, according to Leichteris. 
As mentioned by Hennen and Nierling (2014), it is apparent that all 
these advisory institutions (like science academies, research councils) 
“give strategic advice with regard to the future development of research 
and innovation strategies, which is motivated by national efforts to 
improve the competitiveness of the national economy (“economy first”). 
These authors also say that in Central and Eastern European countries 
this may be related to a great extent to the conflicting character of the 
ongoing and long-lasting political transition period from a nondemocrat-
ic system to a democratic one, using as a reference the work of Roland 
on transition processes (2002). Therefore, the overall situation of the 
Central and Eastern European countries towards TA can be described as 
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unenthusiastic, although there are some TA-like activities being devel-
oped in some countries. 
Conclusions 
There are different levels of TA efforts in European countries and regions 
without PTA. Those with more PTA-like activities are Catalonia, Wal-
lonia, and Portugal. There are also other dynamics with closer links to the 
parliament in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, and other developments 
grounded in research and innovation structures in Hungary and Lithuania. 
Consequently, the possibilities for the emergence of TA in these countries 
and regions vary significantly. The example of Catalonian PTA started in 
1999 and it was established in 2008 under the explicit will of the regional 
government and parliament. It now functions closer to a shared parlia-
ment-science model, producing reports and advice with no staff or budget. 
The Wallonia experience is also a significant dynamic in the European TA 
landscape and might even produce a TA institution in the short term. In 
the Portuguese case, unfavorable national characteristics challenge a 
dynamic academic base and the will of the national parliament, both 
significantly supported by a favorable international context. The experi-
ence of the Eastern and Central European countries are mostly marked by 
TA-like activities and face considerably adverse contexts. In sum, there 
are different levels of efforts in the European panorama, in which the local 
context appears to be relevant to understand what is going on under the 
present supportive European setting. 
It seems to be true that different national contexts imply cultural 
settings and political specificities, which lead to different approaches 
to TA institutionalization. However, what appears to be more im-
portant, from our review of the cases, is to understand the extent of the 
social dynamic around the public production of knowledge and its 
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links to the development of democratic institutions. In fact, these 
countries and regions have found their own and unique ways to solve 
their needs for TA by embedding the production of knowledge wher-
ever possible in their own structures. 
Jasanoff (2005) also mentioned the institutionalized practices by 
which members of a given society test and deploy knowledge claims 
used as a basis for making collective choices. In some cases, these 
social dynamics were linked to the local parliament and in others they 
remained far from it. But, most importantly, these dynamics do not 
necessarily need to be channeled through the institutionalization of a 
new specialized organization. 
We can conclude that TA institutionalization in non-PTA countries 
appears to be dependent on the level of public production of knowledge. 
In fact, the presence or absence of S&T issues on the public agenda of 
these countries and regions affects the need for parliamentary policy 
advice: in their presence, S&T agenda pushes the need for TA advice by 
parliamentarians; in their absence, the promotion of innovation tries to 
keep up with globalization pressures and to generate economic growth, 
without significant demands for TA advice. 
In the later case, the difficulties in deepening participation in democracy 
and the absence of transparent decision-making structures may lead to 
the lack of public involvement, trust, competence, and strategic long-
term thinking. Nevertheless, it may happen that the public distrust in 
political systems and dissatisfaction with existing structures can be 
transformed into an opportunity or a barrier to institutionalization of 
independent policy advice. The answer to such a question may be 
answered by further studies on this issue. 
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Joint Fact Finding: Bridging the 
Evidence Gaps in Decision Making 
Makiko Matsuo, Atsuo Kishimoto, Masashi Tachikawa, 
Masahiro Matsuura 
Introduction 
The Great East Japan Earthquake and the nuclear power plant accident in 
Fukushima of March 11, 2011, resulted in increased public distrust of 
decision makers and expert advisers. Part of the reason for this increased 
distrust is the confusion caused by the fact that (a) the decision makers did 
not sufficiently explain the basis of their decision making and (b) various 
experts expressed different opinions with regard to safety concerns. The 
objective of this paper is to introduce an “old but new” innovative ap-
proach, joint fact-finding (JFF), and explore its usefulness in the context 
of Japan, particularly after Fukushima. It considers what JFF can offer for 
decision making and its merits and challenges for institutionalization. 
Background 
Environment Surrounding Decision Making 
The Fukushima event of March 11 highlights the characteristics of the 
environment surrounding today's decision making. The relationship – 
cause and effect – between science and society is becoming ever more 
complex, uncertain, and dynamic. The shorthand term "NaTech" describes 
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an event like that of March 11, where the effects of technological risk 
were compounded by a natural disaster. Although the risks from the 
nuclear plant itself had of course been considered, the compounded 
impact of the risk of a Tsunami had not. The impact was beyond the 
scope of what had been envisioned: many factors interacted systemati-
cally, not only the health risks but also the environmental, economic, 
and societal factors. It is very hard to grasp the whole picture and 
nobody is sure of what the "right" decision(s) might be. 
These characteristics of the world we live in – increasing complexity, 
uncertainty, and dynamism – mean that today’s decision maker is in a 
very difficult position. These increasing characteristics require him/her 
to catch the "whole mapping of the factors" related to the object of 
his/her decision making and to consider thoroughly the tradeoffs be-
tween the factors and systematic or spillover effects. However, because 
of the limited time and resources and of public pressure, the politicians 
are prone to be obsessed with short-term interests and end up with 
myopic decisions that attract public populism, which in turn damages 
the regulator’s credibility in the long run. 
JFF: An Approach to Accountable Evidence 
To avoid being bogged down in such a situation, it is indispensable for 
the decision maker to obtain evidence that is fully “accountable” (i.e., 
the evidence on which a particular decision is based should be transpar-
ent, sourced, and credited). This evidence is composed of various facts 
that form the basis for decision making. These facts involve both 
qualitative and quantitative facets and are not only limited to the facts 
provided/produced by the natural sciences but also include those pro-
duced by the social sciences. 
JFF is an approach that helps one to obtain such inclusive evidence and 
to bridge the gaps in the evidence. JFF was originally proposed in the 
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US and there are many cases of its application to the environment. It is 
possible to see several examples, as in Ozawa and Susskind (1985), 
Ehrmann and Stinson (1999), McCreary et al (2001), Andrews (2002), 
Adler et al (2011), Karl et al (2007), or in Rofougan and Karl (2005). 
However, there seems to be no single common definition of JFF. In this 
paper, JFF is used to indicate a collaborative approach or process where 
JFF provides a forum for (a) co-framing the problem that needs to be 
addressed and (b) co-producing jointly found facts, including the areas 
of agreement and disagreement. 
The underlying philosophy for seeing the "facts" is different from what 
we term the "old facts" view, where scientific "facts" are objective, 
neutral, and unbiased and therefore any disputes can be resolved by 
seeking the right facts. We consider that "facts" must be enlarged to 
include various facts, not only scientific ones, but also scientific as-
sumptions and the framing behind the facts presented (and these may 
become very close to values) as well as other further facts about social, 
economic, and legal facts (see Figure 2 in Sect. 2.2). It acknowledges 
that scientific facts should be distinct from values but it also accepts that 
facts are often not totally free from values. Decision makers should 
grasp the whole picture of the facts surrounding the issue, which comes 
back to the concept of acountable evidence. 
iJFF and JFF cases and  
the Development of Guidelines 
JFF in Japan 
In response to the increasing public distrust in science and policy deci-
sion making following Fukushima, there has been a growing interest in 
JFF in Japan. For example, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
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convened a series of symposia on the geological disposal of high-level 
radioactive wastes, and one of these symposia was held using the JFF 
approach (February, 2013). However, this is still a rare case of the 
utilization of the JFF approach by the ministries. JFF continues to be 
underappreciated by decision makers, and decision makers are still at the 
stage of exploring the usefulness of such an approach. 
The iJFF (Integrating Joint Fact-Finding into Policy-Making Processes) 
project is one such effort. It is funded by the Research Institute of 
Science and Technology for Society (RISTEX) of the Japan Science and 
Technology Agency (JST), which is affiliated with the Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. It is a three-year 
project (2011–2014). The objectives of the project are to explore the 
applicability of JFF approaches in the Japanese context by conducting 
three action research projects (in the fields of food safety, energy policy, 
and marine spatial planning). It is also aimed at networking with similar 
fields of practice, such as the technology assessment and risk analysis 
communities. We disseminated the outcomes of our research to these 
communities to obtain feedback for consideration. The following sec-
tions provide some of the insights obtained from this iJFF project. 
The JFF Case of Radionuclides in Food 
The iJFF project conducted an experimental JFF dialogue on radionu-
clides in food. The spread of radionuclides as a result of the accident at 
Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant has contaminated food around 
Fukushima and the neighboring prefectures. The risk of radionuclides in 
food was one of the sources of public confusion after the earthquake. 
Since the low risk of radionuclides at low doses is inherently uncertain, 
experts and consumer groups expressed a variety of opinions in the media, 
books, and newspapers. There was a clear need for JFF among experts, in 
the first place to identify the source of their divergent views. The iJFF 
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food safety group engaged in a "pre-JFF activity" to consider possible 
sources of disagreement among the experts (literature reviews and inter-
views etc.) and then held a JFF event at the 26th annual meeting of the 
Society for Risk Analysis in Japan (November 17, 2013). The JFF session 
brought together leading experts on risk assessment/management from the 
food safety community and the radiation community. 
The following provides a brief summary of our findings in the food safety 
group's JFF activities (for more details, refer to Matsuo et al.'s (forthcom-
ing) paper). First, many disciplines are actually interested in the risk posed 
by radionuclides since the radiation is used in variety of fields (Figure 1). 
In contrast to the traditional view that science speaks with one voice, each 
of these disciplines has developed its own way of thinking and had little 
interaction with the other disciplines. Moreover, until the Fukushima 
incident, the food safety community had never considered the risk posed 
by radionuclides seriously, and there was no expert on the risk posed by 
radionuclides in the food safety community. Although one should not 
overgeneralize, there are differences in the attitudes of scientists toward 
radiological risk depending on the discipline. Since there has been less 
interaction between and among the disciplines, there was no general 
consensus about the appropriate way to treat uncertainty. 
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Figure 1: Many disciplines related to the risks posed by radionuclides 
Furthermore, there were different approaches towards uncertainty. In 
fact, at least three ways of handling uncertainty in general terms were 
identified. The first approach treats uncertainty in risk assessment as 
equivalent to “virtually safe”. This approach considers a risk scenario to 
be safe unless it is proven to be harmful since the scientific facts (i.e., 
the scientific data etc.) cannot identify the exact harm. The second 
approach is the exact opposite to the first approach. It considers uncer-
tainty itself to be virtually harmful since you never know what would 
happen until proven safe. Taking this position, you would have to 
endeavor to achieve “zero risk”.57 The third approach is the risk-based 
approach. The biggest difference from the previous two is that this 
approach uses scientific assumptions (for example, the linear no thresh-
old or LNT model) in the analysis. The existence of risk is acknowledged 
                                                                    
57 The European Commission deals with this dichotomy by introducing the criteria that 
the precautionary action that you take should be proportionate to the harm you wish to 
avoid (European Commission, 2000). 
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and the focus is on the consideration of what is the virtually safe level or 
appropriate level of protection. 
The unique dimension identified from the JFF exercise was the consid-
eration of other facts besides scientific ones. As mentioned above, the 
risk posed by radionuclides is a very complex issue. It involves risk 
trade-off issues not limited to health risks but also including other 
socioeconomic risks. In addition, there was a difference in management 
approaches between food risk control and radiological protection in 
general. The methods of treating the acceptable level of risk 
were different. 
To sum up, the JFF approach reveals the existence of different facts that 
constitute the evidence for decision making in managing the risk posed 
by radionuclides in food. The identified facts can largely be categorized 
into three boxes (See Figure 2); (a) the scientific facts based on conven-
tional or traditional science, (b) the facts based on scientific assump-
tions, (c) the other facts such as economic, societal, ethical, or legal 
factors. It should be noted that in the selection of facts for evidence in 
the final decision making, interaction between the facts is needed. 
 
Figure 2: Categorization of facts 
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Development of a Set of Principles for JFF 
In addition to the experimental JFF activities, the iJFF project developed 
a set of principles for conducting JFF exercises, taking into account the 
lessons learned from various experiments with JFF in Japan, a literature 
review, and discussion with a variety of experts at symposia. The princi-
ples are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1: A set of principles for conducting JFF exercises 
(1) Evidence should be acquired by the parties. 
(2) A common understanding about what constitutes evidence 
should be explored. 
(3) Evidence should cover comprehensively the varieties of rele-
vant disciplines. 
(4) Beware of the uncertainty (or unavailability) of evidence. 
(5) Be conscious about identifying who the parties are. 
Conclusion: The Future of JFF 
The Usefulness of JFF 
Several lessons have been identified or reconfirmed by our experience in 
the iJFF program. Firstly, JFF has the potential to transform the deci-
sion-making processes, from top-down and linear to a more collabora-
tive approach. We stress the "joint" and "fact" aspects of JFF. By "joint," 
the scope can be expanded through interaction, since this can bring 
together actors and their frameworks: not only expert and lay persons, 
experts and politicians, but also expert and expert (in the same or differ-
ent disciplines) or experts and politicians and lay persons, for example. 
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It can change the knowledge flow from "expert as knowledge provider" 
to "expert and/or other actors as knowledge producers". 
Secondly, the proposed categorization of facts resulting from the JFF 
food experiment is useful in making explicit the acknowledgement of 
the evidential basis. By explicitly acknowledging the different categories 
of facts, it encourages decision makers and stakeholders to avoid ignor-
ing the implicit consideration of prioritization or trade-off decisions 
embedded in different categories of facts. 
Lastly, the JFF approach challenges the view that science speaks with 
one voice. It questions the assumptions of science in policy making and 
provides an opportunity for reconsidering the conventional way of 
thinking, which can stimulate a learning process among those involved. 
All this contributes to promoting the opening up of evidence and thus 
can provide policy alternatives. By giving explicit reasons for the policy 
choice on the basis of the identified evidence, it can stimulate more 
transparent and evidence-based decision making. It enhances the quality, 
the credibility, and legitimacy of the decision to be taken and should 
contribute to building trust. 
Challenges to an Institutionalization of the JFF Approach 
JFF can be used stand-alone or can be embedded in any step of the 
policy cycle, from agenda setting to implementation and monitoring 
(Adler et al 2011). The proposed approach can be embedded in the 
existing institutional arrangements such as the risk analysis frameworks 
and technology assessment (TA). Since JFF examines various facts 
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associated with complex science and technology issues, thus helping 
decision making, it can be considered a variant of TA.58 
However, in Japan, JFF is yet to be institutionalized in formal policy-
making processes. There are two main challenges to the institutionaliza-
tion of JFF in Japan. One is that our proposed JFF is an approach and 
not a determined methodology. It is a kind of approach to the issue but 
does not prescribe detailed steps or criteria to be followed. The design 
for organizing a JFF event can (and should be) considered in the context 
of the desired objective. It allows flexibility but might be regarded as 
less straightforward or understandable for the practitioners. 
The second challenge may be an obstacle stemming from the unwilling-
ness on the part of decision makers who mistakenly believe this kind of 
effort to be "a threat to their authority," as was pointed by Susskind 
(2008). Decision makers might resist the idea of "opening up" the 
possible alternatives besides the one they opt for. However, it is im-
portant to keep in mind that opening up the discourse to facts can also 
contribute to closing down some policy options. JFF can make it possi-
ble to identify many facts. This inclusiveness helps decision makers to 
consider what should be prioritized and to narrow down the policy 
choices. It helps them to explain the reasons for the choices being made. 
This in turn will contribute to restoring confidence and trust. 
  
                                                                    
58 However, there are some differences (in a relative sense) in terms of issue scope and 
time scope. In terms of issue scope, while JFF is more focused and issue or problem 
oriented, TA assesses the broader impacts of a specific technology. With regard to 
time scope, JFF puts more emphasis on the analysis of the current situation but TA 
looks at the “now to future” impact. JFF is similar to participatory TA and construc-
tive TA but starts from the premise that expert advice itself is not “given.” 
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Note 
The main body of this paper is based on the Matsuo et al (forthcoming) 
Joint Fact-Finding (JFF) of the Risk posed by Radionuclides in Food. 
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Global Pressure – Local Transition: 
The German “Energiewende” as an 
Interdisciplinary Research Problem in 
the Helmholtz Alliance ENERGY-TRANS 
Christian Büscher
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Introduction 
Global events have effects on local policies. Energy supply is a global 
event, where three major issues arise on local levels too. First, environ-
mental degradation  which severely affects the local population (e.g. oil 
spillage in coastal regions or on oil fields in Latin America, Africa, 
Russia etc.) and dangerous accidents (e.g. nuclear power plants in the 
USA, Ukraine, or Japan). Second, the combination of a global demand 
for energy sources which is increasing and an availability of energy 
carriers which is decreasing (e.g. “peak oil”). Third, changes in the 
climate system and the struggle for global political solutions. People are 
preoccupied with these issues and therefore various reactions occur at 
local levels: large technology projects are feared and opposed, values 
and lifestyles change and political programs are modified. 
The German public has long debated the advantages and disadvantages 
of nuclear technology and fossil energy generation, eventually leading to 
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the project – some call it experiment – of the German Energy System 
Transition (Energiewende). 
The German Energy System Transformation (hereafter the “GEST”) is a 
political program to exploit renewable energy sources (RES), by devel-
oping and implementing technical systems. It is increasingly apparent 
that this energy system transformation poses socio-technical problems 
which require more than merely technical solutions. These socio-
technical problems require, moreover, social solutions; both on the level 
of the energy system as a functional unit (of organizations, regimes and 
networks), as well as on the level of individual action. The common 
theme underlying these socio-technical problems is the balance of 
stability and change. On one hand, new technical and organizational 
paradigms are necessary; on the other hand, everybody expects reliabil-
ity, security and affordability of energy provision. 
Tensions and breaches arise on distinctive levels of the energy system: 
 On the functional level, the continued paradigm holds that  
energy is produced by large technical systems; however, this 
paradigm is strained by the new, competing idea of energy  
production by decentralized units. 
 On the organizational level of regimes and networks, the domi-
nance of large enterprises obstructs the inclusion of manifold 
small-sized actors operating in niches. 
 On the level of households and individual action, the unreflect-
ing attitude that energy is always available (energy flat rate) is 
still widespread, although it must be replaced by a more active 
role of ‘prosumers’ who not only consume electricity, but also 
produce it. 
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The energy system is understood, by the Helmholtz Alliance ENERGY-
TRANS, “as a complex socio-technical system.” Based on this perspec-
tive, the Alliance “conducts interdisciplinary research into the systemic 
interactions of the envisioned energy transition.” It reunites over sixty 
“social and political scientists, psychologists and philosophers, econo-
mists, legal scholars, engineers and systems analysts”, who conduct 
interdisciplinary research “on the interplay between technical potentials, 
innovation processes, user behavior, political and economic conditions 
(…), conflicts and management processes.”60 This paper addresses 
sociological research problems along the common referential research 
theme of stability and change. 
Premises of the Energiewende 
From its beginnings in the 1970s, Technology Assessment has sought to 
comprehensively assess the social, economic, political, legal, technical 
and ecological consequences of purposeful, planned action. The GEST 
is a program where political action tries to determine the course of the 
overall development of a crucial infrastructure system. We neither know 
what the consequences of this endeavour will be, nor how far-reaching 
they will be. However, it seems reasonable that technology assessment 
can only understand the consequences of an extensive political program, 
if it exposes, analyzes, and assesses the latent premises. These premises 
have to be met, in order to yield a successful transformation – as widely 
envisioned. It is important to debate the answers to questions such as: 
 Are the assumed premises realistic? 
 Who will be affected by the consequences? 
 Are there any alternatives which are not discussed enough? 
                                                                    
60 See the introduction to the project: www.energy-trans.de/english/21.php, 19.5.2015 
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Scenarios of possible developments are derived from scientific visions, 
expectation statements and policy papers about the GEST. This plethora 
of statements from scientists, engineers, economists, politicians and 
other stakeholders needs to be analyzed in a multi-dimensional fashion, 
emphasizing distinctive problems beyond the usual economic cost-
benefit rationale. 
The GEST is based upon the following three premises which pose 
particular research challenges from a sociological perspective. 
First Premise: System Change despite Stability 
The GEST implies substantive changes in enduring technological 
paradigms regarding the organization of energy supply (generation, 
transportation, distribution and consumption). Moreover, the transfor-
mation requires a change in market coordination, because the process of 
liberalization enforces an unbundled energy economy with new laws, 
regulations, taxes, and subsidiaries to stimulate, limit, and control all 
transactions. However, the transformation is expected to proceed with a 
maximum stability of energy provision. 
Therefore, recent research on the energy system transition tries to 
explain the relationship between  stability and change of socio-technical 
systems and regimes: Whilst stability provides orientation and allows for 
action, change makes learning, innovating and intelligent adaptation to 
new circumstances possible (most prominent: Geels 2004). Hence policy 
makers and actors need to decrease resilience in some parts of the 
energy system, while increasing it in others (Strunz 2014) to unlearn, i.e. 
to “exnovate”, common practices and knowledge  (Gross and Mautz 
2015), or to substitute dominant “field logics” (Fuenfschilling and 
Truffer 2014), or to destabilize regimes (Geels 2014). The appropriate 
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balance of stability and change is particularly important in the context 
of critical infrastructures, where large scale failures may have cata-
strophic consequences. 
Despite the need for change, stable orientations – like rules, norms, 
and routines – are necessary to absorb uncertainty in a complex envi-
ronment. Therefore, these orientations should not be shattered all at 
once, or too abruptly. From a global, systemic perspective, the norma-
tive goal of sustainability has to be accompanied by measures to 
ensure the sustainment of current operation. Organizational theory 
frames this problem as the balance between  “redundancy” and “varia-
tion” (Luhmann 1988b): Both are indispensable, but too much variety 
causes volatile, erratic behavior, whilst too much redundancy causes 
inertia, lock-ins and path dependencies. 
Second Premise: System Transition as a Project 
The political program of the GEST is usually depicted as a project with 
an identifiable starting point which begins the planned process and 
results in the desired end-results: affordable and reliable, but more 
sustainable, energy. The whole endeavor has been initiated based upon 
the assumption that the end-state will be superior to the current state. 
However, nobody knows whether these far-reaching and broad goals 
will be reached, since they depend on projections about possible, and 
therefore contingent, futures. 
In order to launch the GEST, a large portion of uncertainty has to be 
overcome, the knowledge about non-knowledge has to be ignored, and 
the possibility of failure has to be erased from contemplation. In order to 
increase our motivation to act, we rely on shared ideologies to reduce 
alternatives and fade out the corresponding consequences to a minimum 
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(Brunsson 2007:46). The idea of the Energiewende might be such a 
highly functional ideology, though it is also highly precious and fragile. 
Already, discussions about the absence of “the master-plan” are growing 
louder. The observation of an un-organized, chaotic transformation 
process erodes core assumptions of the Energiewende ideology. 
Moreover, there will not be a final state of affairs in the sense of a 
consummated GEST, for, as a large technical system, it constitutes a 
linked series of socio-technical problems. This means that novel solu-
tions at one end of the system (e.g. RES) will always produce new 
problems at the other end (e.g. long distance transportation and storage): 
“At the largest scales, principles of increasing speed, volume, and 
efficiency drive the entire economy, with each increase in one ar-
ea creating a reverse salient in another” (Edwards 2004:209). 
The inevitable obstacles, miscues and unwanted consequences will lead to 
disappointments on the way. More importantly, if these negative events 
gain symbolic value, they may endanger the whole project because – in 
their function as symbols – they undermine the idea(l) of the project, and 
therefore the program stands to lose the support of the public. 
Third Premise: ‘Prosumers’ as Rational Actors 
Visions of ‘smart grids’, ‘demand-side management’, ‘virtual power 
plants’, ‘electric vehicle management’ and ‘energy prosumers’ illustrate 
assumptions about the changing role of the general public: Former 
service abiders are to become active service providers (Depuru, Wang, 
and Devabhaktuni 2011; Ramchurn et al. 2012). 
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The promise of a new technology which makes energy provision easier 
can only be fulfilled with a sharpened distinction between a simple 
operating interface and a complex technology underlying this interface. 
Accordingly, ‘prosumers’ must forsake control for the benefit of trust. 
The general public cannot control the system, nor the consequences of 
their actions, and therefore have to rely on trust. From a functionalist 
point of view, the overall system can only realize its potential if prosum-
ers possess actionability. 
To participate in energy system services, the general public has to develop 
confidence in the technical, economic, and legal programs of this system. 
Without trust and confidence, the public cannot successfully exploit the 
chances and opportunities of future developments. Public distrust – or 
even a mere lack of public trust – could be reflected in passive, fatalistic 
attitudes, or lead to a search for autonomy, or obstructing action. Overcon-
fidence, on the other hand, could lead to hazardous actions. As a conse-
quence, trust, rather than public acceptance, may well constitute the 
reverse salient of energy system transformations. 
Sociotechnical Problems 
For the purpose of interdisciplinary research, strict theoretical defini-
tions which all research branches have to align to are not helpful. In our 
experience, it is most helpful to reach an understanding about shared 
referential problems, to which different lines of research contribute with 
their respective theories and methods. For the GEST, it does not help to 
insist on a single definition of the system under observation, i.e. the 
elements, interrelations, boundaries, mechanisms of reproduction, input-
output-relations, etc. Nonetheless, there is the need for cognitive integra-
tion to the degree that every statement resulting from the interdiscipli-
nary research effort ought to refer to a common referential problem. 
Technology Assessment in Japan and Europe 
110 
For the GEST, the various disciplines often refer to the concept of a 
‘socio-technical system’, because the system’s transformation depends 
both on social and on technical variables. This concept incurs various 
theoretical and methodological difficulties, for example in terms of 
exactly selecting the included from the excluded elements influencing 
the operation of such a system. Another difficulty lies in analyzing the 
relationship between the technical and the social components in more 
depth than just stating that they constitute a “seamless web” (Hughes 
1986). The notion of a seamless web presupposes that heterogeneous 
elements are aligned to fulfill the system’s overarching purpose (ser-
vice), i.e. providing power, and that as single (sub-) units these elements 
fulfill a certain function within the system: power plants provide, trans-
mission lines transmit, control-units measure, adjust and regulate, etc. 
Socio-technical systems comprise “linkages between elements necessary 
to fulfill societal functions” (Geels 2004:900) and 
“socio-technical regimes themselves tend to be understood in 
terms of networks of actors and institutions clustered around 
the fulfillment of social and economic functions“ (Smith, Stir-
ling, and Berkhout 2005:1507). 
However, by referring to the reproduction of the system (i.e. maintaining 
operation), or the boundaries or the identity of such a system, we en-
counter the multi-purpose design of organizations involved in networks 
of service provision such as electricity, health, telecommunications, 
water management etc. This can be illustrated by private enterprises 
involved to some extent in public electricity provision while, at the same 
time, having to maintain business and compete on markets (i.e. in other 
contexts than electricity services) – no matter where revenue comes 
from, it has to be secured. 
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Consequently, it is not far-fetched to state that the reproduction of a 
social system, such as a private company, is primarily a self-serving 
purpose and thus not necessarily aligned to the overall purpose of an 
energy system – i.e. providing electricity. In this regard, the concept of a 
socio-technical system as a closed, seamless entity of heterogeneous 
elements cannot capture the fact that organizations contribute to the 
system in more ways than their planned operations. In fact, the constant-
ly evolving system produces solutions for problems and problems for 
solutions simultaneously: “The overall [socio-technical] system can be 
fruitfully described as posing a linked series of socio-technical prob-
lems” (Edwards 2004:209). The introduction and implementation of 
RES during the last decades has replaced carbon dependent energy 
provision and that fact in itself creates new challenges for storage and 
transportation (for example for electricity), for the organization of 
production (market interaction, regulation), and for legislative decision-
making regarding the installation of corresponding infrastructures 
(power plants, physical networks). 
Rather than aligning research to common theoretical definitions about 
socio-technical systems, it seems helpful to expose shared socio-
technical problems. In this sense, we refer to three analytically distinct 
dimensions of the energy system: structure, institution and operation, 
and extract three respective socio-technical problems. 
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Complexity of Future Energy Systems 
Experts increasingly experience the energy system operation’s complexi-
ty.61 The new and evolving energy system comprises a greater number of 
heterogeneous technical and social elements and, therefore, new and still 
evolving relationships between those elements. Changes in the technical 
organization of production impose complex consequences, just as changes 
in the regulatory structure create complex effects on the social organiza-
tion of production (see for a useful heuristic: Mayntz 2009). 
With the widespread introduction and integration of RES the problem of 
‘volatility’ becomes manifest. ‘Volatility’ describes the possibility of a 
range of fluctuating occurrences and leads to the problem of control. In 
other words, we are uncertain about subsequent events, because various 
futures are contingent, and thus are we exposed to undertaking risks. 
Within the electricity domain, volatility is a problem for operators who 
must sustain the equilibrium of electricity inflow and outflow within the 
physical network of transportation and distribution of electrical power. 
Nowadays, instead of basing their calculations on a few nuclear and coal 
based power plants with a constant output, operators must calculate with 
a multitude of ‘producers’ who do not constantly feed into the network 
(e.g. because weather conditions determine the output). To not only 
achieve greater control over the emerging energy infrastructure, but also 
to increase the overall efficiency (by aligning generation to consumption 
and vice versa), far-reaching visions of smart technologies are brought 
to bear on the domain of the energy system. Many of these visions are 
inspired by progress in information and communication technologies 
and, more specifically, in electronic data processing. 
                                                                    
61 Result from our field research in 2012/2013 (results will be published in 2015). 
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Many proponents of ‘smart technology’ envision greater developments 
than the automation-paradigm such as artificial intelligence and, particu-
larly, self-monitoring and self-healing functions. We can expect the 
existence of machines as “autonomous actors” under human supervision, 
but not necessarily under human control (Amin 2001; Ma et al. 2009; 
Ramchurn et al. 2012). Throughout the infrastructure system, we already 
face emergent behavior which cannot entirely be explained with reference 
to  the behavior of the individual elements of the system (Kröger and Zio 
2011:195). If autonomous, self-modifying and learning non-human actors 
will be implemented in future grid control programs, then the issue of 
control will be paramount. In addition, as the reader will discover below, 
questions about trust and the delegation of control will ensue. 
Based on current visions, we have to expect the emergence of more 
intertwined technical networks, such as local systems connected to 
larger networks, which will themselves depend on other enabling struc-
tures (such as the transportation system). 
“In general, infrastructures are not systems. Instead, they are networks 
or webs that enable locally controlled and maintained systems to in-
teroperate more or less seamlessly” (Edwards et al. 2007:12). 
Large technical systems evolve into ubiquitous and reliable structures, 
which operate on national and transnational scales to distribute widely 
shared resources. More importantly, the degree of control depends on 
whether the structure is: 
 a local system which is centrally organized and controlled, 
 a linked systems, i.e. a network, where control is distributed 
(partially or wholly) among the nodes of the networks, or 
 a network of networks, i.e. a web, which is based primarily  
on coordination rather than control (Edwards et al. 2007:12). 
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Consequently, new forms of market transaction need to be coordinated 
and supervised. European legislature has introduced rules on “unbun-
dling” which impose operational disintegration on the current energy 
system – a system which has grown according to the requirements of 
central control. Künneke (2008:239) claims that 
 “[from an] institutional perspective, the electricity value chain seems to 
evolve towards unbundling and specialization, whereas technology is 
based on integrated system planning”. 
Some researchers warn that unbundling may cause a loss of control and, 
consequently, a deterioration of the quality of service (Künneke 2008). 
To be more precise, ‘unbundling’ usually refers to the separation of 
functional subunits within the system. However, in the case of energy 
provision, ‘liberalization’ constitutes a political program that is exoge-
nous to the energy system. It is the attempt to create and expand markets 
in highly functionally integrated domains, by forcing disintegration. 
Accordingly, the question arises how changes in governance constella-
tions can buffer this kind of misalignment. From a sociological point of 
view, it is crucial to deal with the functionalist problem of ignorance, non-
transparency, complexity, decision-uncertainty and risk in the face of large 
socio-technical systems. The typical response from scientists and engi-
neers involves promoting more technology to solve these problems. That 
is not false – but only half the truth. There are many indications that we 
experience a ‘dialectic’ development with the widespread use of electronic 
data processing: Firstly, more data processing capabilities, but also the 
need to develop methods of selecting useful data resulting in actual 
information. Secondly, more productivity, but also new frictions if con-
ventional organizational structures are forced to incorporate new technol-
ogies. Thirdly, more transparency through elaborate models about organi-
zational processes, but also more complicated algorithms which only 
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specialists can understand – algorithms that are intertwined in even more 
complicated networks which no single person can control. 
What is potentially a problem for scientific experts, is certainly a prob-
lem for lay persons. Many people are now more aware of the problems 
that a ‘network society’ entails – and these problems do not only con-
cern the ongoing surveillance by state agencies and by private compa-
nies. People experience more convenience with the use of internet 
technology, but at the same time they also experience how dangerous it 
is, exposing them to fraud in internet banking, as well as other hazards 
during socializing, shopping and using ‘smart homes’. People realize 
how helpless they are. These threats are becoming more and more 
sophisticated, leaving little possibility for most of us to actually compre-
hend what is going on technically, let alone how to protect ourselves. 
Stable Expectations and Learning 
Because of the pressure which global society faces today, proposals to 
transform local infrastructure systems are prevalent in a variety of policy 
programs. Researchers, too, also write about the necessity to change 
systems (Geels 2014:2). Nevertheless, the expectations about the output 
and service of socio-technical systems remain stable, since socio-
technical systems are defined with regard to their purpose. Although it is 
yet unknown how exactly the system will evolve, it is widely expected 
that the future energy system will provide energy. The energy system is 
not only a (infra-)structure, but also an institution: the notion of an 
‘institution’ indicates robust social orientation in the sense of general-
ized expectations, viable over long periods of time. 
According to some authors, the strength of a regime depends on the 
degree of institutionalization of core elements which contribute to its 
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stability and function. Transition research is looking for structural 
densifications of this kind (as regimes), and it tries to explain how these 
densifications change (Smith et al. 2005; Grin, Rotmans, and Schot 
2010; Fuenfschilling and Truffer 2014). In this way, institutions are at 
the heart of transition research. 
However, research on institutions also needs to focus on maintaining 
capacities for learning, experimenting and transition within socio-technical 
systems. In particular, the relationship between structure and institution is 
emphasized to uncover ways of directing transitions onto a more sustaina-
ble path (Weber and Rohracher 2012:1041). On one hand, the notion of 
‘structure’ indicates the quality and the quantity of single system elements 
unified by a particular purpose in the factual dimension. Institutions, on 
the other hand, indicate how these elements relate to each other and 
unravel rules that follow. Hence we understand the term ‘institution’ to 
mean a complex of expectations attributed with certain values which are 
generally shared among various actors in specific domains. 
Many German researchers consider the GEST to be a large socio-technical 
experiment that entails a high degree of uncertainty and non-knowledge, 
but is an unavoidable process, since there are no  viable alternatives 
(Gross and Mautz 2015:144). From the perspective of structure and 
control theories, there is a need to adjust the degree of coupling (loose/ 
tight) of experimental projects to the existing systems. According to 
normal accident theory, tight coupling and non-linear interactions cause 
dangerous settings in socio-technical systems (Perrow 2011). Nonetheless, 
local energy experiments must be conducted in real life constellations, yet 
without compromising the entire system when (inevitable) errors occur. 
Only by trial and error, can experiments generate knowledge that serves as 
a foundation for crucial developments. 
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From the perspective of institution theories, the actors must un-learn 
conventional, successfully applied technologies, norms and habits. That 
is valid for all organizations and professionals in the field, but also for 
the general population. German citizens are still getting used to the 
liberalization of gas and electricity markets and learning (or not) how to 
compare prices and services to select an appropriate supplier. For 
example, representatives of a traditional communal energy supplier 
(Stadtwerke) in Germany, explain that they still have long-standing 
customers who pay their monthly bills personally at the counter – and in 
cash. That is why they still operate a cash counter. The other side of the 
behavioral spectrum shows customers who are very much accustomed to 
comparing prices, substituting suppliers, and changing contracts every 
year. A major difficulty of institutional theory is determining the suc-
cessful balance between stable orientations regarding service provision 
and changes, in form of innovations, learning and un-learning. 
Actionability Despite Non-transparency 
Many researchers deem ‘acceptance’ the crucial variable of a successful 
transformation of an energy system: 
“No problem is more stark or troublesome – yet extremely 
important – than that of public acceptance” (Kasperson and 
Ram 2013:91). 
Yet acceptance is also the most difficult prerequisite to fulfill during 
changes in complicated technologies, non-transparent markets and 
regulatory settings. Even if acceptance is gained, this does not necessari-
ly lead to the active involvement of citizens, it may result in passive 
tolerance only. Moreover, in cases where issues of acceptance arise, the 
situation usually gets more and more complex, as positive and negative 
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consequences, interests, motives and values, as well as potential alterna-
tives, tend to become more visible to the participants. While this ‘trans-
parency’ is a vital necessity for democratic legitimation, everyday social 
life does in fact need a certain amount of ‘voluntary blindness’, i.e. the 
reduction of complexity ‘to get things done’. Furthermore, acceptance is 
supposed to be result of extraordinary social exercises such as participa-
tion, be it via public hearings, mediation, or other forms. While these 
efforts are necessary to resolve conflicts, they are by no means routine. 
In Germany, we frequently observe conflicts over large infrastructure 
projects (like airports or large train stations) that result in such exercises. 
However, there is not always a need for public consent, such as every 
time people use public transport. 
Nonetheless, for a positive outcome of the GEST, the overall population 
must develop some kind of attitude which stimulates action. The alterna-
tive strategy is to rely on the mechanisms of trust and distrust. Trust is a 
social mechanism for enabling action. Trust ‘neutralizes’ dangers which 
cannot be removed, but which should not disrupt actions. Trust is 
necessary in situations where somebody needs to assess how others will 
perform, before it is possible to monitor their actual performance (Gam-
betta 2008:217). We need to ‘trust in trust’ in order to enter situations 
which we cannot control, but which offer opportunities. Therefore, trust 
widens the scope of possible actions. However, it is the genuine quality 
of trust that makes it fragile: “Trust has the circular, self-presupposing 
and confirming character” (Luhmann 1995:129). 
Trust-building costs time and effort. On the other hand, minor incidents 
let trust crumble and turn into distrust. Moreover, as trust is a self-
referential commodity (Gambetta 2008), it cannot be enforced easily. 
Advertising for trust raises suspicion and is generally seen as hardly 
authentic (Japp 2010). Distrust, then, leads to the search for alternatives 
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to avoid the situation, or to precautionary measures, i.e. additional 
support, if the distrusting actor cannot avoid involvement. 
A final implication concerns trust/ distrust in persons, rather than trust/ 
distrust in systems (i.e. the services, structures, or institutions involved): 
 “Social evolution which achieves increasingly complex societies may in 
fact generate systems which require more confidence as prerequisite of 
participation and more trust as a condition of the best utilization of 
chances and opportunities” (Luhmann 1988a:99). 
(Dis-)Trust in the Energy System 
Attitudes towards complex and abstract systems for the provision of 
services are determined by experience with the reliability of the service 
outputs and with malfunctions, accidents or catastrophes, but also 
through the observation of symbolic references to the system, such as 
technical installations or familiar representatives of organizations 
(Stadtwerke). 
Experience with infrastructure systems varies drastically from region to 
region, and from case to case. Overall, confidence in the reliability of 
electricity supply has been struck by setbacks in the USA (Kasperson 
and Ram 2013), while the confidence among the German population 
may, in the near future, be overstretched because barely anyone is 
prepared for a prolonged interruption of service as a result of  lacking 
experience (Petermann et al. 2011:238). 
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A series of accidents – from Three Mile Island to Chernobyl, and, 
recently, Fukushima62 – may have shaken the overall confidence in the 
technological branch of nuclear power generation. Fukushima has been 
depicted again and again as triggering the GEST.63 Negative experienc-
es encourage people to search for responsible actors, i.e. those towards 
whom trust had been addressed, and to decide whether such trust is 
warranted in the future. When a citizen’s sense of trust has crumbled, 
several potential addresses of blame come to mind, such as private 
companies, the public administration and the government. 
Shortly after the accident in Fukushima, several newspaper reports were 
published about the systematic, non-legitimate relationships between 
members of national nuclear regulatory regimes and the nuclear indus-
try. Some researchers suspect that the revelation of such corruption leads 
to the (short-term) erosion of public trust (Tanter 2013) and that such a 
potential key incident remains ‘stuck’ in the public memory. Trust issues 
are triggered by key incidents and, moreover, by processes of attribution 
for who is responsible (or who is to blame) and the processes of deci-
sion-making on how to continue the trust relationship. 
Although decisive trust indicators in public crises constitute symbolic 
references, the energy system is largely invisible, with the exception of 
visible infrastructure (pylons, plants etc.). 
“[It is a] naturalized background, as ordinary and unremarka-
ble to us as trees, daylight, and dirt” (Edwards 2004:185). 
                                                                    
62 For the consequences of the Fukushima accident see (Khazai, Daniell, and  
Wenzel 2011) 
63 A claim worth challenging because of the many influential developments preceding 
this event; see (Bruns et al. 2010). 
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In our ‘normal mode’ we suppress any thought of the energy system, 
until it ‘reappears’ after accidents or failures. Infrastructure systems 
which require more direct interaction than the energy system are usually 
more susceptible to the influence of symbols: For example, on my first 
trip to Japan I marveled at the public transport system with brilliant 
ticket vending machines, impressive train technology and accurate 
punctuality, despite millions of daily travelers. I particularly noticed the 
formal behavior of the train personnel: The conductors wear uniform; 
they greet each other in military stile on shift exchange, then hold the 
door for the conductor all the while bowing down to show respect for 
the colleague. This little scene – everyday behavior for all involved – 
has symbolic value; it induced a great deal of confidence on my part and 
I deduced that the personnel apparently takes its responsibilities very 
seriously, enabling customers to trustingly commit themselves to use the 
transportation service although they are, for a determined period of time, 
physically exposed to the conducting skills of strangers. 
Once current visions become incorporated into the future energy system, 
the role of the general public will change. More members of the public 
will cease to be a passive ‘audience’ which obtains electricity services; 
they will become active ‘entrepreneurs’ contributing to service provi-
sion. This new role assumes that actors develop a positive attitude 
towards unfamiliar technology, non-transparent markets and abstract 
regimes. The required positive attitude is composed of ‘confidence’ and 
‘trust’. Confidence is an attitude which helps ignore the limits, con-
straints, or dangers in situations where someone is not capable of influ-
encing the social environment with his/ her own actions. 
In Germany, people are confident that energy will be available tomorrow, 
despite their awareness of scenarios from science and fiction about 
possibilities of infrastructure breakdowns and bottlenecks. Most people 
are not prepared to live without energy for a longer period of time (Fekete 
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2011:15). Lack of confidence, on the other hand, can lead to a search for 
autonomy from energy system services. Diminishing confidence in 
technical services is exemplified by the growing Preppers movements in 
the USA and in Europe. Diminished confidence in turn leads to distrust of 
other persons, i.e. of governmental agencies, and trust is reserved only for 
one’s own ability to prepare or to be prepared. However, we can find more 
modest examples. In recent years, less extreme cases of large-scale dis-
trust have occurred, such as the generalized rejection of biofuel in Germa-
ny (E10) and, in the case of EHEC, of vegetables. 
While distrust nonetheless triggers action, lack of trust will usually 
hinder action. For example, distrust led to opposition against ‘smart 
meters’ in private homes. The fear of data abuse by unauthorized agents 
contributed to a shift in Dutch energy policy: 
“The mandatory acceptance of the meter for consumers [has 
been shifted] into voluntary acceptance” (Hoenkamp and 
Huitema 2012:2). 
The paradox formulation of this citation indicates the sociological 
problem at hand: Future energy systems are dependent on voluntary 
participation in terms of investments in energy technology and/ or 
‘smart use’ of electricity. While overconfidence (‘blind trust’) can lead 
to excessive risk-taking, i.e. carelessness, a ‘healthy distrust’, confidence 
in the overall energy system transformation, and particular trusting 
actions are prerequisites for active involvement. Both, trust and confi-
dence, systematically reinforce one other, and only if a certain threshold 
of trust and confidence is present, do people commit themselves to 
participate actively in the overall process (Kasperson and Ram 2013:95). 
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Governance of Trust 
The idea of ‘Governance of Trust’ can assemble and reunite certain 
pointers for further research. First of all, thinking about trust and confi-
dence in systems leads to the question of ‘access points’ which can 
enable operators, investors, consumers, etc. to attribute trust/ distrust. In 
this regard, the concept of an “architecture of trust” (Strulik 2007) is 
promising. For the abstract and mostly invisible energy system, an 
extensive architecture contributes to trust relationships in all three 
dimensions (structural, institutional and operational). In all three cases, 
the concept of an ‘architecture of trust’ provides a setting for varying 
addresses of trust attribution. 
(6) In the structural dimension, trust relationships can be addressed 
towards material objects (e.g. infrastructures) and towards  
organizations (e.g. large companies and local cooperatives  
(Energie-Genossenschaften)). 
(7) In the institutional dimension, trust relationships can be based 
on shared rules, values and roles. 
(8) In the operational dimension, trust can be attributed to different 
time frames for maintaining the service in the present (experi-
ence), to the ongoing transformation process (programs which 
are scientific, technical and political), or even to future states 
(visions and expectation statements). 
In addition, the architecture of trust affects the validity and intensity of 
thresholds of trust/ distrust: How much information retrieval do actors 
perform before taking a trusting decision and, simultaneously, how 
much ignorance are actors prepared to tolerate? 
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Tentatively, we can identify well-known or novel addresses of trust: 
 Trust/ distrust in black boxes like ‘autonomous, smart and  
intelligent’ agents can raise questions on the appropriate level 
of delegation of control. 
 Trust/ distrust in agreements about responsibility for participa-
tion in virtual power plants and in decentralized networks. 
 Trust/ distrust towards persons/ roles, organizations and their 
decision programs which refer to different functional domains 
in society, for example private enterprises which comprise eco-
nomic (infrastructure-investments) as well as legal, political 
(lobbyism), or scientific (applied, industrial research) activities. 
 Trust and distrust in institutionalized regimes. 
Certainly, trust cannot be enforced or successfully subjected to adver-
tising. The buildup of trust takes a long time. Yet the corrosion of trust 
takes only minor occurrences. Thus recognizing the necessity of trust 
and confidence in the future energy system constitutes only a first step, 
whilst elaborating on the conditions on how trust can be developed is 
the next step. 
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Abstract 
To address global problems of sustainability, which are often ill-defined 
and intermingled, it is necessary for us to achieve a scientific under-
standing of the complex and dynamic interaction between natural and 
human systems and the steps taken by society to attain sustainability 
innovation. To do this, we need to integrate knowledge from various 
academic disciplines in the natural sciences, social sciences, and human-
ities effectively and efficiently. Considering the significant degree of 
diversity and uncertainty involved, a major challenge is determining 
how to organize and implement serious participation and fruitful collab-
oration between academia and stakeholders, including industry, the 
government, and civil society. This will require careful consideration of 
the types of joint initiatives and networking suitable to contribute to 
identifying desirable goals and targets and to developing complementary 
skills and capacities, of the mechanisms and stakeholder relations that 
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have been put in place to drive practices and initiatives, and of the 
factors that promote or obstruct their successful implementation. Con-
sidering the diversity of stakeholders in terms of their perceptions, 
motivations, and behavior dependent upon economic, social, and histori-
cal contexts, a key for creating knowledge, designing targets, and 
implementing processes for innovation would be the creation and 
management of stakeholder platforms. 
Technology assessment would be conducted concurrently with strategic 
resource logistics, in which collaboration with stakeholders is promoted 
for creating, sharing, and utilizing the relevant knowledge together in 
society so that feedback from them is well integrated into the process of 
technology assessment. This paper examines a case of innovation 
facilitated by the creation of stakeholder platforms for sustainable 
management of phosphorus. Participants were researchers and practi-
tioners involved in the entire value chain ranging from exploration and 
mining to processing, transport, use, and recycling. The lessons to be 
learned from facilitating the sharing of knowledge and expertise by 
stakeholders by means of strategic resource logistics would contribute to 
establishing socially robust models of sustainability innovation. 
Introduction 
Sustainable phosphorus management concerns the supply chain from the 
point where phosphorus-containing waste has been produced by 
humans, livestock, and industry. While dissipation refers to the intended 
or unintended loss of phosphorus in mining, processing, and use, 
recycling covers the processing, marketing, and use of recycled waste 
products. One of the critical challenges for sustainable phosphorus 
management is to make phosphorus recovery economical, reliable, and 
predictable, while ensuring that the use of recycled phosphorus products 
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does not have an adverse impact on health or the environment. It is 
therefore crucial to manage phosphorus stocks and flows using a 
systems approach, linking exploration, mining, processing, use, 
dissipation, and recycling (Matsubae-Yokoyama, Kubo, Nakajima, and 
Nagasaka, 2009; Matsubae, Kajiyama, Hiraki, and Nagasaka, 2011). 
Particular attention needs to be paid to the current and potential markets, 
quality, and price of products, costs of production processes, the 
available and future forms of technology, institutional structures, and 
public perception and behavior. The stakeholders involved are diverse, 
including industries creating waste streams and others focusing on 
phosphorus recovery and include farmers, governmental regulatory and 
specialized agencies, public environmental and health organizations, 
researchers in academia, and agricultural and health non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). It is very important to give a comprehensive and 
structured overview of the current state of our knowledge and to identify 
and major gaps in research. 
To address this challenge, Global TraPs (Transdisciplinary Processes for 
Sustainable Phosphorus Management) has been initiated as a 
multistakeholder project on the sustainable management of the global 
phosphorus cycle and involves academia, industry, and the public sector 
(Yarime, Carliell-Marquet, Lang, Le, Malley, Matsubae, Matsuo, Ohtake, 
Omlin, Petzet, Scholz, Shiroyama, Ulrich, and Watts, 2014). We examine 
the potential for recycling phosphorus from a variety of waste sources as 
well as for preventing phosphorus dissipation by establishing socially 
robust business models integrating innovative technologies, business 
strategies, and public policies. Sustainable phosphorus management is 
explored using an integrated approach combining technological, 
management, and policy perspectives (Yarime, 2010). 
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Among the questions to be addressed are: 
 What are the technological challenges for reducing costs and 
improving the quality of recycled phosphorus? 
 How ca a system for the effective and efficient matching of 
supply and demand for recycled phosphorus be established? 
 What similarities and differences can be identified in 
phosphorus recycling between different sectors, including 
agriculture and manufacturing? 
While there is a large potential for recycling phosphorus from different 
sources, only a small portion of the secondary phosphorus resources has 
been utilized so far. As the supply chain of phosphorus ranges from 
exploration, mining, and transportation to its use and recycling, it is of 
critical importance to establish a system for collecting, sharing, and 
utilizing a large amount of data and coordinating the behavior of the 
relevant stakeholders involved in the different stages of resource flows. 
The creation and management of stakeholder platforms would be a key 
for cocreating knowledge, codesigning targets, and coimplementing 
processes for a sustainability transition. In Japan the Phosphorus 
Recycling Promotion Council has been established recently with experts 
from academia, industry, and the government to design and implement 
national strategies for socially robust phosphorus recycling systems. In 
Europe, the Nutrient Platform has been initiated in the Netherlands, 
together with private companies, knowledge institutes, government 
authorities, and NGOs agreeing to share and utilize any relevant 
knowledge. In this paper a preliminary analysis is conducted to examine 
the mechanisms for establishing stakeholder platforms in different 
contexts. Particular attention is given to understanding how to design 
and implement a system facilitating serious participation and fruitful 
collaboration among stakeholders, what types of joint initiatives and 
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networking contribute to identifying desirable goals and targets and to 
developing complementary skills and capacities, and what factors 
promote or obstruct their successful implementation. Also discussed are 
the implications for establishing a system for sustainable phosphorus 
management on the basis of global cooperation. 
Challenge of Sustainable  
Phosphorus Management 
An essential first step toward the sustainable management of phosphorus 
is the mapping of the direct and indirect demands for phosphorus in an 
economy. For example, the substance flows of phosphorus in the Japa-
nese economy are estimated to be 618 kt (Matsubae, Kajiyama, Hiraki, 
and Nagasaka, 2011). Approximately 284 kt of phosphorus is employed 
annually at farms and ranches in the form of fertilizer, one of the largest 
input flows in the entire domestic phosphorus flow. The values of input 
flows to the food and feed sectors are also large, mainly from world 
imports and marine resources (163.1 kt) and the domestic crop produc-
tion from farmlands (45.2 kt), with the phosphorus mainly being con-
sumed by humans and livestock (97.6 kt and 111.0 kt). Livestock grows 
by eating grass and feed on ranches, and the phosphorus in livestock 
manure ends up accumulating in the soil, the amount of which (285.3 kt) 
is nearly equal to that from fertilizer at farms and ranches. Another main 
output is the human waste that ends up flowing down rivers, in the 
ocean, or in landfill. In addition, 110.5 kt of phosphorus is associated 
with the steel industry as mineral resources, most of which is condensed 
in slag from steelmaking. 
There are a variety of potential phosphorus resources within the Japa-
nese economy, including food waste, sewage sludge, steelmaking slag, 
and other industrial wastes, totaling approximately 240 kt per year, 
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which is comparable to the amount of phosphorus used annually in 
fertilizer of approximately 284 kt. Hence, an appropriate nationwide 
recycling strategy could potentially provide the majority of phosphorus 
required for agricultural production in the country. Sustainable phospho-
rus management is also of economic importance. While the size of the 
domestic fertilizer market is only five billion U.S. dollars per year, it 
supports all the food-related industries and businesses in the country, 
whose total sales reach 800 billion U.S. dollars. 
In the vegetation process, fertilizer is used for plant growth. Not all the 
phosphorus in fertilizer, however, is transformed into the harvested 
products, as loss is caused by absorption in the pedosphere, diffusion 
into the hydrosphere, and waste in residual portions of agricultural 
products. Substance flow analysis focusing on the phosphorus contained 
in products tends to neglect such phosphorus flows. As a new indicator 
for considering the direct and indirect phosphorus requirements of 
society, the virtual phosphorus ore requirement (VPOR) has been 
proposed (Matsubae, Kajiyama, Hiraki, and Nagasaka, 2011). As in the 
case of virtual water (Hoekstra and Chapagain, 2007), estimation of 
VPOR requires that hidden phosphorus flows be taken into considera-
tion, which constitute the total phosphorus requirement excluding the 
amount contained in agricultural products and including the loss to the 
environment, nonedible parts, and feedstuff for livestock. 
The characteristics of current phosphorus management practices and 
approaches in different sectors are diverse with regard to the temporal 
and spatial scales of the issue; technological measures, including the 
types of technology, energy consumption, costs of investment and 
operation; key stakeholders involved, such as farmers, industry, 
consumers, and public sectors; and institutional conditions, including 
public policies and interventions. A solid understanding of the factors 
influencing phosphorus dissipation and recycling in different domains 
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will be necessary to achieve sustainable phosphorus management. 
Potentially there are three main areas for implementing phosphorus 
recycling: recycling of the phosphorus contained in food and feed; 
recycling that from wastewater; and recycling that from industries that 
use high-quality phosphate (Ohtake, 2010). 
Recognizing the significance and potential of phosphorus recycling, 
some experts and practitioners have started to pay attention to the 
development of phosphorus management and recycling as a new green 
industry. The active involvement of industry, however, is still limited, 
and there are not many cases in which phosphorus recycling has been 
successfully implemented in practice. At the current stage of 
development, the recycling of phosphorus is not a feasible business 
opportunity, as the conventional practice of buying normal fertilizers 
while wasting water and sludge is much cheaper. The recycling of 
phosphorus, therefore, has not yet become a strategic issue for major 
companies in the chemical industry. One of the critical issues which we 
need to tackle is how to establish socially robust business models in a 
broader sense, integrating scientific understanding, technological 
development, corporate strategies, and public policies, for a successful 
implementation of phosphorus recycling. 
Roles and Functions of the 
Transdisciplinary Process 
In the transdisciplinary process, a crucial step toward jointly defining the 
problem and conducting transdisciplinary case studies is to build 
partnerships among key stakeholders (Scholz, 2011). Relevant actors in 
academia, industry, government, and NGOs need to be involved in 
identifying the critical challenges (Yarime, Trencher, Mino, Scholz, 
Olsson, Ness, Frantzeskaki, and Rotmans, 2012). While the need for 
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phosphorus recovery has been identified as an important issue by 
various institutions, the actions taken by stakeholders around the world 
continue to be limited. In designing a phosphorus recycling system, it is 
necessary to approach this issue at multiple levels, including local, 
national, and global levels (Shiroyama, Yarime, Matsuo, Schroeder, 
Scholz, and Ulrich, 2012). 
While the recycling system would depend very much on the local 
characteristics and context, it would  also be influenced by national 
resource management strategies and institutional frameworks. Generally 
speaking, the recycling of phosphorus is not yet considered to be a high 
priority issue at the national level, except in a few countries such as 
Sweden, where a target is set to recover 60% of phosphorus from 
sewages by 2015. A full commitment to implementing phosphorus 
recycling has not yet been made by industry, which is increasingly 
influenced by the business environment in the global economy. 
Many actors in different sectors have stakes in recycling phosphorus. 
Phosphorus can be characterized as an essential, nonsubstitutable, but 
low-cost commodity that each person consumes, as well as a source of 
environmental pollution. It is crucial to identify who has what kind of a 
stake within the system and to find the best way to realize a situation in 
which a common solution is found for satisfying different interests and 
objectives (Shiroyama, Yarime, Matsuo, Schroeder, Scholz, and Ulrich, 
2012). For instance, close collaboration between cement companies, 
fertilizer companies, and the local government can be a potential source 
for implementing phosphorus recycling. The sewage department of a 
local government has to extract phosphorus to meet the water quality 
standard to avoid environmental degradation. Fertilizer companies need 
phosphorus for producing fertilizer, and cement companies require the 
level of phosphorus contained in sludge to be low because sludge with a 
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high concentration of phosphorus can weaken the strength of the product 
(Ohtake, 2011). 
Currently one of the most serious challenges to the recycling of 
phosphorus is how to expand the market for recycled phosphorus. For 
this purpose it is very important to maintain the stability of supply and 
the quality of products utilizing recycled phosphorus. Institutional 
measures to accelerate the closing of the phosphorus chain would 
include implementation of phosphorus discharge criteria in waste stream 
regulations and revision of lengthy and cost-intensive permission 
procedures and requirements for recovery technologies (Drizo, 2012). 
We then need to prepare for sustainable transitions by exploring feasible 
strategies for social business models, with the relevant stakeholders 
being closely involved. To do this, we could consider pursuing 
consensus at two levels. The first one is whether we should go for a soft 
or detransformation of sewage and wastes. While there has been concern 
about heavy metals, new chemicals, pathogens, and other biological 
issues, it is not completely clear whether a kind of soft processing 
including organic matter might be a better option than incineration. This 
type of consensus building could take place in a precompetitive arena, 
although it might also affect industrial competition at a later stage. 
Creation of Stakeholder Platforms 
in Japan and Europe 
A preliminary analysis is conducted to examine the emerging examples 
of the successful implementation of the recycling of phosphorus in 
Japan and Europe. In Japan, for example, phosphorus recycling in the 
sewage treatment plant in Gifu, Japan, has been in operation since 2010, 
and the fertilizer utilizing recycled phosphorus has been sold to farmers. 
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Where phosphorus removal is performed in sewage works, sludge 
mono-incineration ash contains phosphorus at concentrations similar to 
those of rock phosphate. A full-scale plant for phosphorus recovery from 
sludge incineration ash has recently started operation at Gifu city in 
Japan (Goto, 2009). The full-scale plant is now making a great contribu-
tion to the sustainability of local agriculture because the quality of the 
recovered phosphorus matches the local demand very well. There are 
critical challenges, however, including the high capital cost for plant 
construction and the difficulty in establishing stable channels for the 
distribution and sale of recycled phosphorus, which might discourage 
the expanded use of this technology. 
In Europe, a couple of companies which previously operated in the field 
of detergents are now utilizing their extensive knowledge of phosphorus 
for different types of purification and reprocessing. Ostara is running 
five plants for recycling phorphorus in Europe. Companies such as 
Thermphos, Prayon, and ICL have already joined the Global TraPs 
project. The development and implementation of innovative 
technologies is currently being explored in Germany, and recovery 
measures in the water sector and from manure have started being 
introduced in the U.K. 
The knowledge generated in the transdisciplinary process is expected to 
be used by practitioners in their business and policy decisions for 
achieving a sustainable use of phosphorus, which demands cooperation 
and coordination across different sectors. Close collaboration among 
relevant stakeholders including academia, industry, and the public sector 
is urgently required in order to cope with this critical challenge (Yarime, 
Trencher, Mino, Scholz, Olsson, Ness, Frantzeskaki, and Rotmans, 
2012). As an attempt to address this, the Phosphorus Recycling 
Promotion Council of Japan (PRPCJ) was established in 2008 by 
inviting experts from academia, industry, and the public sector to 
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participate. This nationwide association is supported by the four relevant 
ministries of the Japanese government and currently has approximately 
140 members, including more than 70 corporate members. Based on the 
PRPCJ activities, a national platform for industry-academia-government 
collaboration was also initiated in 2011 to discuss and implement 
national strategies for robust phosphorus recycling systems. 
In Europe, the Nutrient Platform was established in 2011 in the Nether-
lands, with more than twenty Dutch companies, knowledge institutes, 
government authorities and NGO’s signing the Phosphate Value Chain 
Agreement (Dutch Nutrient Platform, 2011). The Nutrient Platform is a 
cross-sectoral network of Dutch organizations that share a common 
concern for the global impact of phosphorus depletion and the way 
society is dealing with nutrients in general. Together with the Dutch 
government, the Nutrient Platform intends to support organizations 
throughout the value chain in completing the phosphorus cycle. They all 
share the ambition of creating a sustainable market within two years, 
where as many reusable phosphate streams as possible will be returned 
to the cycle in an environmentally friendly way and where the recycled 
phosphate will be exported to the fullest extent possible, as long as a 
surplus exists in the Dutch market, in order to contribute elsewhere to 
soil improvement and food production. To achieve the vision and 
mission, the platform practices an approach of learning by doing within 
a framework of action learning and new types of partnerships. 
The First European Sustainable Phosphorus Conference 2013 was held 
in Brussels in March 2013, with the purpose of raising awareness about 
the necessity of a more sustainable phosphate management within the 
context of a resource efficient Europe (European Phosphorus Platform, 
2013). Its goal was to facilitate support for a clear and coherent legisla-
tive framework to create an enabling environment for eco-innovation, a 
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sustainable European market for secondary phosphorus, and more 
efficient phosphorus use. 
Different nutrient waste flows and market possibilities will be connected 
between stakeholders, including the private sector, knowledge institutes, 
government, and NGOs, to further develop sustainable nutrient chains 
within Europe. At the conference, participants reached a consensus to 
launch the European Phosphorus Platform in order to continue dia-
logues, raise awareness, and trigger action to address the phosphorus 
challenge, with significant implications for ensuring food security, 
geopolitical stability, and environmental sustainability. 
In North America, a kickoff workshop was organized in May 2013 to 
launch the Research Coordination Network (RCN) in Washington, D.C. 
(Sustainable P Initiative, 2013). The workshop was meant to bring togeth-
er some of the world’s top scientists, engineers, and technical experts to 
spark an interdisciplinary synthesis of data, perspectives, and understand-
ing about phosphorus to envision solutions for phosphorus sustainability. 
Key stakeholders from relevant sectors shared their knowledge and 
expertise on various dimensions of the global phosphorus system, includ-
ing farmers and growers, food processors, fertilizer producers, waste 
managers, water quality managers, regulators, and legislators. Two 
challenges were identified, namely phosphorus efficiency and phosphorus 
recycling. The RCN coordinating phosphorus research has been funded by 
the National Science Foundation to create a sustainable food system. 
These experiences of establishing national or regional platforms involv-
ing key stakeholders will provide valuable lessons and implications for 
implementing phosphorus recycling successfully in different technologi-
cal, economic, and institutional contexts. 
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Technology Provider and 
Receiver Interactions: The Capability 
Threshold Concept and Its Application  
to Technology Assessment 
Shingo Kano 
Background 
There are very broad definitions of technology assessment (TA), such as 
those provided by Coates (1976), Porter (1995) and Decker (2004). 
These definitions commonly pointed out that TA includes policy and 
social studies and multiple dimensions of technological analysis from 
the viewpoint of various stakeholders. Decker (2004) provides one 
typical explanation: “Technology assessment (TA) is a scientific, inter-
active and communicative process, which aims to contribute to the 
formation of public and political opinion on societal aspects of science 
and technology." Multidimensional analysis, however, easily leads to 
complexity, decreased accuracy, and tradeoffs between width and depth. 
A common perspective of analysis across various stakeholders is re-
quired to avoid such complexity and eliminate the horizontal aspects of 
TA. The analysis should have a more narrow focus and the potential to 
generalize observations to other cases. This chapter focuses on a study 
of how a recognition gap occurs between an innovator and other stake-
holders beginning from a more narrow focus on the recognition gap 
between innovators. Technology transfer, especially in university-
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industry relationships, represents a relationship between stakeholders 
who are highly technologically knowledgeable. The university as a 
technology provider and the firm as a technology receiver both have 
difficulty handling early stage technologies without a proof of concept. 
The constraints and limitations on these stakeholders serve as a good 
reference and control for the relationships with nontechnical stakeholders. 
Generally, the more creative and original the university research, the 
fewer the researchers in this field who are able to recognize the value of 
the research and the lower the probability that a company has such 
personnel. Such research consequently exceeds the capacity for evalua-
tion and cannot be absorbed through channels such as collaborative 
research and licensing. It is therefore difficult to evaluate ideas at an 
early stage of research, i.e., before acquiring a proof of concept in the 
process of technology transfer. 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) discussed the notion of “absorptive capaci-
ty,” illustrating an organization’s knowledge to create innovative capa-
bilities and defining a firm’s ability “to recognize the value of new, 
external knowledge; assimilate it; and apply it to commercial ends.” 
Drawing on the view of a firm’s dynamic capabilities, Zahra and George 
(2002) showed how absorptive capacity determines the gap between a 
firm’s potential and its realized capacity to innovate. 
Atkinson (1994) reported on a partial failure of traditional technology 
transfer at the Harvard Medical School based on a survey of disclosures 
and proposals for industry relationships from 1977 to 1980. He ex-
plained it as follows: 
 “While a significant portion of these were appropriate for traditional 
patenting and licensing, a pattern emerged for a select category of 
projects for which that approach was ineffective. These projects were 
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based on seminal technologies with the potential for broad applications – 
rather than leading to a single product, they might lead to a class of new 
diagnostics or therapeutics. Despite their patentability and power, 
however, they rarely attracted serious interest from established pharma-
ceutical firms until at least three to five years after initial disclo-
sure.”(Atkinson, 1994) 
This case explains the phenomenon wherein, within a specific situation, 
an emerging new technology falls into the development gap, for which a 
university spin-off company is needed to serve as a technology bridging 
vehicle to facilitate industrialization. Atkinson (1994) commented that 
this was the reason Harvard University set up its university-affiliated 
venture capital fund. The implication is that technology transfer depends 
both on the nature of the technology and the receiver’s capabilities. The 
point of departure is the recognition gap between university and compa-
ny research. At the heart of a firm’s technology transfer problems is the 
question of how to deal with that gap. 
To illustrate these gaps between technology providers and receivers, 
Kano (2001) proposed the concept of the technology-transfer effective 
frontier to define the forms of technology transfer. With some generali-
zation and modifications, this gap analysis framework can be applied to 
other TA stakeholders. 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce an analytical framework for 
technology transfer between innovators, and then expand this framework 
to apply to relationships between an innovator and other stakeholders to 
explain the recognition gap in TA. 
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The Concept of a Technology-Transfer 
Effective Frontier 
University-industry relationships (UILs) typically involve a technology 
transfer process from one organization to the other, with activities 
covering simple licensing and collaboration accompanied by scientific 
and technological evaluations. Companies exhibit rational behavior in 
evaluating a university’s research. First, a company will import technol-
ogy from outside the firm if it is relevant to the firm’s core businesses. 
Second, the firm must understand the content of the technology to 
effectively integrate it with its in-house technology. Those two compo-
nents constitute the firm’s absorptive capability. 
If the research is at an embryonic stage, the firm will have difficulty 
determining its relevance to its businesses and understanding its scien-
tific content. Therefore, the lower the maturity of the research, the 
higher the level of absorptive capability needed by the firm. 
Figure 1 depicts this relationship, showing the maturity of academic 
research on the x-axis and the firm’s required level of absorptive capaci-
ty on the y-axis. Given the stage of maturity of academic research, the 
level of absorptive capacity can be determined as a threshold value, 
below which a technology transfer is unlikely. These threshold values 
constitute a continuously decreasing function, called the technology-
transfer effective frontier. In other words, the shaded region is the area 
where technology transfer occurs. 
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Figure 1: Technology-Transfer Effective Frontier 
Recognition Gap and Bridging Paths 
After establishing the technology transfer framework, it is possible to 
investigate why the gap exists. The limits to university research are 
defined by the maturity coordinates, beyond which research is no 
longer conducted in the academic institution. This concept is illustrat-
ed in Figure 2. 
This limitation of university research can be drawn as a vertical straight 
line that intersects at the value of α in the x-axis. The shaded area 
surrounded by the line denoting the limit of university research and the 
technology-transfer effective frontier is the area where technology 
transfer from university to industry occurs. 
Public-sector-funded basic research should be of a level of maturity 
lower than α. Those firms whose absorptive capacity is below β, which 
is the value of the y-axis value intersected by the value of α in the  
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x-axis, cannot absorb the research even if the subject of the research is 
within the limits of their businesses. 
Even if the university research progresses further, the collaboration 
between the university and the firm might never occur for research 
located below the technology-transfer effective frontier. This situation is 
the “recognition gap,” and the distance toward the frontier can be used 
as the degree of the gap. 
 
Figure 2: Concept of Gap in UIL 
Figure 3 illustrates the three types of “bridging path” classifications 
shown across α on the x-axis. The issue for corporate strategy and 
management is how to develop collaboration so as to extend university 
research and commercialize it beyond the α level. 
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Figure 3: Bridging path classifications 
 Type I bridging exists when the company can absorb science 
directly from the university through joint research. Most traditional 
Japanese UILs belong to this type of collaboration. The corporate 
strategic problem is how to enhance the firm’s absorptive capacity. 
 Type II bridging exists if a gap between the university and an 
industrial firm must be bridged by an intermediary such as a start-
up company. A start-up unit has to extend the academic research to 
bring it within the firm’s absorptive capacity. An in-house venture 
unit within a firm can perform this intermediary function if it is as-
sured substantial autonomy. 
 Type III bridging exists if extending the research will never lead 
to the business domain of an existing company. Therefore, new in-
dustries and firms must be created to absorb those areas to continue 
the research and realize its industrialization. 
These three bridging paths are theoretically introduced from two prem-
ises, the technology-transfer effective frontier and the limited maturity 
of the university. Each bridging path depends on the nature of the 
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technology and the ability of receiver-specific solutions to resolve issues 
between the technology provider and receiver. 
The Generalized Concept of 
“Effective Frontier” for TA 
The concept of this type of capability threshold and its solutions as the 
technology matures could be applied to other stakeholder relationships, 
especially in the early stages of research. To expand this concept from a 
technology-transfer effective frontier to a technology assessment (TA) 
effective frontier, we must address the following points. 
Profiling a stakeholder’s value chain and activities 
It is necessary to identify a target stakeholder’s main interests and 
describe the complete process to meet their interests that are independ-
ent of a scientific and technological evaluation. To break down the total 
process for TA and understand the activities in each process, a value 
chain analysis covering both upstream and downstream activities is 
essential. The value chain analysis provides information about a stake-
holder’s critical interests and provides goals and benchmarks. 
Integrate a stakeholder’s major interests and technology insight as 
their capability 
Since the capability threshold concept is based on the integrated capabil-
ities of both a firm's major interests and its technology evaluation, these 
two must be synthesized. 
Introduce “the concept of threshold” to a stakeholder’s “required capability” 
The capability threshold concept is based on the threshold of the stake-
holder’s “required capabilities” to communicate with innovators and to 
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understand the technology from their viewpoint at a given stage of 
technology maturity. The threshold itself continuously decreases as the 
technology matures, representing the TA effective frontier. 
Determine the point at which the R&D maturity creates a critical issue for 
both an innovator and a stakeholder 
At some stages of an innovator’s activities, there are choke points or 
bottleneck points restricted by the characteristics of the stakeholder or 
innovator. For example, in the technology transfer model, the university 
is limited by how long it can continue research beyond a certain maturi-
ty. Innovators must also meet regulatory standards to start clinical 
development for medical products. These are the typical bottlenecks in 
R&D activity for innovators. In other word, stakeholders must address 
and/or control these choke points. 
Describe the interactions between an innovator’s and stakeholder’s activi-
ties as an interaction path: 
The TA effective frontier could divide the space into “effective space” 
and “ineffective space,” which explains why a stakeholder’s capability 
inevitably delays technology maturation. When a technological devel-
opment progresses to a critical point of maturity without reaching the 
stakeholder’s benchmark, the interaction path enters ineffective space 
and falls into the recognition gap. 
Explain a specific event or phenomenon using an Interaction Path 
Finally, this framework could be applied to explain real cases of innova-
tor and stakeholder interactions in the case of a failure. However, this 
would require a careful description of the interaction path and whether 
the stakeholder’s capabilities are positioned within the upper threshold 
at the critical point. Unless it exceeds the threshold, the innovator and 
the stakeholder could not communicate well in the effective space, and 
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if the stakeholder has control over the research, its activity will fall into 
the recognition gap. A method drawn from organizational science may 
be appropriate to analyze the communication. The figure 4 integrates 
these elements to illustrate the framework. 
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Figure 4: TA effective frontier framework 
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An Application to Innovator-Regulator 
Relationships 
The TA effective frontier concept also applies to innovator–regulator 
relationships. The Research Institute of Science and Technology for 
Society (RISTEX) in Japan has implemented a project based on this 
concept, “Scenario Planning to Create Regulatory Policies and Tech-
nical Standards in Advanced Medicine” from 2013 to 2016. 
There are many stakeholders in the medical field, such as research 
funding agencies, university researchers, medical product and/or service 
companies, patent agencies, regulatory agencies, investors, insurance 
organizations, physicians, hospitals, and patients, and the most powerful 
stakeholder, the regulatory agencies, who not only need scientific and 
technological insight but also can take a broad view to create regulations 
for medical products and services. Figure 5 illustrates the application of 
this concept to this case. 
The project started by profiling the regulatory agency activities and a 
value chain analysis. The scope of the case study includes identifying 
the regulator’s benchmarks, checking the innovators’ bottleneck points, 
and organizational approaches using the boundary organization concept 
to clarify the interaction between innovators and regulators and the 
reason behind the gap. While this project has only just started, the 
outcome could provide a good example of the application of the TA 
effective frontier. 
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Figure 5: Stakeholders’ activities with innovator 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the technology-transfer effective frontier for 
technology provider–receiver interaction to explain the concept of 
capability thresholds and to demonstrate that this decreases as technolo-
gy matures. 
Secondly, this framework was extended to apply to an analysis of the 
interaction between TA stakeholders to a TA effective frontier frame-
work accounting for other considerations, including profiling a stake-
holder’s activities, the threshold of required capabilities, research 
limitation points, and the interaction path concept. 
The TA effective frontier is a general framework for explaining the 
limitations of stakeholders’ capabilities at a given technology maturity 
that is capable of providing an analysis of various TA situations with a 
variety of types of stakeholders. The trajectories described as interaction 
paths visualize the recognition gap between stakeholders and also 
provide the clues to potential solutions. The applicability of this frame-
work is now being validated against innovator–regulator interactions in 
the medical field. 
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Technology Assessment Activity at 
the National Diet Library of Japan 
Shinichi Kobayashi 
Introduction 
In Japan, the history of technology assessment (TA) activities for the 
national government and the Parliament is still short. However, since the 
necessity of such TA activities is being reviewed in foreign countries, 
the National Diet Library (NDL), which is an institution of the Japanese 
legislature, has begun to discuss the necessity of TA activity. Its TA 
activity was started in concrete form in 2010. This paper relates the 
background and the present state of adoption of TA activity at the 
National Diet Library.65 
Among TA activities, those conducted for the government and the 
Parliament have a clear purpose. Their purpose is to explain the conse-
quences that each featured technology will have on the government and 
its wider impact on our society. Inevitably, these TA activities must be 
objective in a sense different from that observed by the research activi-
ties conducted by ordinary researchers. In other words, TA needs to be a 
thorough and balanced analysis of critical technological innovations that 
affect our society, the environment, and the economy. 
                                                                    
65 In Japan, the English expression of Kokkai (Parliament) is the “National Diet,” which 
sounds slightly archaic. In this paper, the national library attached to the parliament is 
referred to as the National Diet Library, or NDL. However, Kokkai is referred to as the 
Parliament in this paper unless otherwise necessary for the convenience of readers. 
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Japan is one of the countries that lead the world in the field of science and 
technology, and the NDL, which is the principal library of Japan, naturally 
holds Japan’s largest collection of scientific and technological infor-
mation.66 The collection includes an enormous volume of scientific and 
technological data such as the doctoral dissertations of Japanese universi-
ties and the reports of research results obtained under grants-in-aid from 
the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, in 
addition to books and academic journals in the field of science and tech-
nology. However, it is little known that the NDL not only holds such 
scientific and technological information, but also has investigative and 
analytical functions concerning science and technology. 
The NDL is required to respond to the diverse needs of society. In particu-
lar, its greatest mission is to provide services to the Parliament and related 
bodies. Among such services, TA activity is still very modest both in 
terms of time and experience, and even NDL does not refer to it as par-
liamentary TA. The recognition of this activity in Japan and abroad is 
therefore not high. Nevertheless, its intent and activities should not differ 
substantially from parliamentary TA in Europe and the United States. 
This chapter is intended to describe the intent and activities of the NDL 
and to deepen the discussion on TA activity conducted for the national 
government, Parliament, and related bodies. 
                                                                    
66 The National Diet Library has both the function of the Parliament’s library and that of a 
national central library. In addition, since Japan does not have a national science library, 
the National Diet Library holds books, magazines, and other material in all fields. 
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Discussion on the Necessity of TA Activity 
at the National Diet Library 
In 2004, the National Diet Library formulated its “Basic Plan for the 
Development of Science and Technology Information – Execution of 
Immediate Tasks and a Library Structure after Reorganization.”67 In this 
plan, “Services for the Parliament and Related Bodies68” were positioned 
at the beginning of response to diverse needs. Those items contain the 
following statement: “In recent years, various issues on science and 
technology have become important issues of national policies, on which 
references requested by the Parliament have more focused. The services 
for the Parliament in such areas are characterized by the fact that policy-
related information that meets national policy tasks and issues, rather than 
pure science and technology data, is required. 
“To sufficiently fulfill our library’s functions designed to contribute to 
legislation and deliberations on science and technology, we will further 
strengthen the following activities.” And, “pursuing the enhancement of 
information on science and technology contained in publications of the 
Research and Legislative Reference Bureau” is listed as one of the 
specific activities to be strengthened. 
To deliberate on the improvement of the scientific and technological 
information system at the NDL, the Council on Organization of Materi-
als on Science and Technology (present Council on Organization of 
                                                                    
67 The National Diet Library, “Basic Plan for the Development of Science and Technol-
ogy Information – Execution of Immediate Tasks and a Library Structure after Reor-
ganization (2004 – 2006),” 2004.1. (in Japanese). 
http://dl.ndl.go.jp/view/download/digidepo_1000920_po_maintenance_plan.pdf?conte
ntNo=1 
68 The phrase “Parliament and Related Bodies” refers to the House of Representatives, 
the House of Councilors, their members, committees, and Secretariats, political par-
ties, and so on. 
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Science and Technology Information) was established at that time. In 
December, 2004, the council formulated its “Recommendation on the 
future of science and technology information system at the NDL in the 
electronic information environment”69 in accordance with the Basic Plan 
for the Development of Science and Technology Information. 
The recommendation also contained an item on strengthening the 
library’s function of assisting in the legislative activities of the Parlia-
ment. In this item, it is recommended that: “the National Diet Library 
should seek to expand its function of providing assistance to legislation 
from the viewpoint of both enhancing information resources, including 
electronic information, and securing human resources. In terms of 
human resources, in particular, NDL should seek to develop and aug-
ment personnel having scientific literacy for appropriately providing 
scientific knowledge and specialized information to members of Parlia-
ment and those related to the Parliament on issues concerning science 
and technology.” It goes without saying that this recommendation 
positions not only the provision of assistance to legislation at the Par-
liament, but also the dissemination of information such as “responding 
to the needs for information on various scientific and technological 
topics in which the population will be broadly interested, such as the 
environment, medical care/pharmacological affairs, nuclear power 
generation and natural disasters,” and contribution to “developing 
children as bearers of the future of our society’s science and technolo-
gy,” both of which have a complementary relationship with the provi-
sion of assistance, as important tasks. 
                                                                    
69 Council on Organization of Materials on Science and Technology, “Recommendation 
on the future of science and technology information system at the NDL in the elec-
tronic information environment,” 2004.12. (in Japanese) 
<http://dl.ndl.go.jp/view/download/digidepo_999250_po_teigen.pdf?contentNo=1> 
Technology Assessment Activity 
167 
In addition, this recommendation indicates recognition of the change in 
circumstances, stating: “Greater emphasis is being placed on the shift 
toward fusion or integration between science and technology and other 
fields, humanities and sociology, in particular, from the classical idea 
centering on science and technology. In fact, in many cases approaches 
that integrate a scientific and technological viewpoint and an economic 
and social viewpoint are required for solving national problems and 
citizen-level everyday problems.” It further indicates: “NDL must fulfill 
its role of bonding science and technology with society by providing 
objective information for making decision on the positive and negative 
impacts of science and technology on people’s life to the venue of national 
policy deliberations, and directly transmitting it to the population.” 
Such indications are based on almost the same recognition as the argu-
ments in which a revival of the congressional TA function is expected 
around the same time in the United States.70 In other words, the reality of 
science and technology and society in the twenty-first century has stirred 
up similar arguments, making it inevitable that such an argument would 
also be started in Japan. Additionally, a wave of these arguments has 
accelerated the start of TA activity at the National Diet Library in Japan. 
Strengthening of TA Activity at the 
National Diet Library 
Of course, this does not mean that no TA-like activity had been con-
ducted at the NDL before then. For example, an irregular feature series 
                                                                    
70 In the U.S. Congress, an argument calling for the revival of the Office of Technology 
Assessment (OTA), which was an organization attached to the Congress, continued 
after it was abolished in 1995. The Government Accountability Office (GAO), another 
organization attached to the Congress, has been the body officially responsible for TA 
since the fiscal year 2008.  
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entitled “Political Challenges over Science and Technology” has been 
published in “Research and Information – ISSUE BRIEF,” a periodical 
publication of the NDL.71 In addition, the publication had once intro-
duced TA activities conducted overseas.72 
However, in response to the above arguments, the Research and Legisla-
tive Reference Bureau73 of the NDL has considered it necessary to 
clarify the features of NDL’s services for the Parliament and the fields 
of research on which the NDL would place particular focus in the future. 
The NDL identified science and technology as one of these fields. 
In this policy, it was decided to strengthen the NDS’s research on science 
and technology “select important national policy issues on science and 
technology, conduct research in cooperation with external intellectuals 
and specialized organizations, and prepare reports. NDL will also conduct 
the commissioning of part of the tasks to external bodies including the 
translation of reports prepared by TA institutes in other countries. 
                                                                    
71 “Political Challenges over Science and Technology 2009,” Research and Information 
– ISSUE BRIEF, No.633, February 2009; “Political Challenges over Science and 
Technology 2007,” Research and Information – ISSUE BRIEF, No.563, February 
2007; “Political Challenges over Science and Technology 2004”, Research and Infor-
mation – ISSUE BRIEF, No.459, November 2004. 
72 Meitetsu Haruyama, “Parliamentary Technology Assessment as a Dialogue between 
Science & Technology and Society,” Reference, No.675, April 2007, pp.83-97. (in 
Japanese) <http://www.ndl.go.jp/jp/diet/publication/refer/200704_675/067505.pdf>; 
Hisanori Tanaka, “Technology Assessment in the U.S. Congress,” Reference, No.675, 
April 2007, pp.99-115. (in Japanese) 
<http://www.ndl.go.jp/jp/diet/publication/refer/200704_675/067506.pdf> 
73 In Japan, the research function for providing assistance to legislation has been placed 
in NDL, just like the United States ha the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in 
the Library of Congress (LC). This is the Research and Legislative Reference Bureau. 
The secretariats of the House of Councilors and the House of Representatives have 
divisions responsible for legislative research there as well as at the NDL. While the 
research function of the secretariats of the Houses is mainly research on legislation, 
the bureau is broadly in charge of all kinds of research on administrative oversight and 
assistance to legislation. 
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NDL will strengthen its research structure, for example, by setting up 
an office that assumes the central role.” Implementation of this policy 
took the form of the launch of a Science and Technology Project and 
the establishment of the Science and a Technology Research Office74 
in FY2010. 
In particular, with regard to the “translation of reports prepared by 
foreign TA institutes,” NDL was expected to conduct its activity of 
providing assistance to legislation while translating reports prepared by 
U.K., German and other countries’ parliamentary TA institutes and 
constantly watching overseas trends of TA. However, after several 
introductory papers75 were published, the translation or introduction of 
foreign reports has not yet been implemented.76 
As mentioned earlier, behind these considerations there is a lack of 
technology assessment in a broad sense that has a function of providing 
assistance on legislation or a function of research on science and tech-
nology, as indicated in the above-mentioned recommendation in 2004 
by the Council on Organization of Materials on Science and Technology. 
                                                                    
74 The Research and Legislative Reference Bureau consists of two lines of researchers: 
research service offices and research divisions. Research service offices conduct im-
portant research and assure the quality of divisions’ researches. The divisions conduct 
regular research on request. Among the 15 divisions, the Education, Culture, Science 
and Technology Division covers fields of science and technology policy as well as 
education policy. The Science and Technology Research Office was established as a 
part of the Education, Culture, Science and Technology Division. One of the missions 
of the Science and Technology Research Office is to manage the science and technol-
ogy projects, while several research service offices supervise the projects. Two or 
three researchers belong to the Science and Technology Research Office, while two or 
three visiting researchers assist in steering the science and technology projects. 
75 Terumasa Oiso, “Parliamentary Technology Assessment in Different Countries: Focus 
on Germany,” Reference, No.726, July 2011, pp.49-66. (in Japanese), < 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/jp/diet/publication/refer/pdf/072603.pdf> 
76 This does not mean that the introduction of foreign TA reports has been excluded from 
its business. The NDL may introduce foreign TA reports, as necessary, in the future. 
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In other words, expectations are still present that TA activities in a broad 
sense from a contemporary perspective will continue in Japan. 
Science and Technology Project 
Major research activities conducted by the Research and Legislative 
Reference Bureau of the NDL are divided into three types: research in 
response to requests by the Houses and their Members, anticipatory 
research, and project-type comprehensive research.77 In research in 
response to requests from legislative bodies, committees, and members 
of Parliament, research on politics, the economy, national policy chal-
lenges from the public at large, circumstances and systems in Japan and 
abroad, and other topics is conducted in a short time period. These 
activities are intended to reply to individual request, and none of the 
contents of the activities are published. The NDL replies to approxi-
mately 40,000 various major and minor requests every year, and some of 
these requests are related to science and technology. In contrast, antici-
patory research activities are conducted voluntarily based on forecasts of 
possible national policy issues. The results are published in three publi-
cations: “Research and Information – ISSUE BRIEF”, “Reference” and 
“Foreign Legislation”78. 
                                                                    
77 Under the National Diet Library Act, research conducted on request and anticipatory 
research are prescribed. Project-type comprehensive research is a form of anticipatory 
research. However, since it is conducted by a team of interdisciplinary researchers, 
and to distinguish it from ordinary research conducted by one or a few researchers, 
this paper classifies and introduces comprehensive research as the third category.  
78 These publications are available not only to those related to the Parliament, including 
members of parliament, but also to the general public through the Internet. In addition 
to these publications, NDL holds “Policy Seminars” for members of parliament, their 
staffs, and other Parliament staff members to provide them with information. Howev-
er, this information is not available to the public. 
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Project-type comprehensive research is also a form of anticipatory 
research in terms of its content and formal category. For each of cross-
sectoral topics, a cross-bureau project team is formed to conduct re-
search for approximately one year, and a report on the results is issued 
as a publication entitled “Research Material.” In these activities, topics 
from science and technology are covered in some cases. Recently 
covered topics included “Regeneration of Japan through technology and 
culture” (2012), “Policy response to the Great East Japan Earthquake 
and problems” (2012) and “Building a sustainable society” (2010). 
These publications have been posted on the web page of the NDL.
 
Apart from the above-mentioned research activities, a project-type 
research activity called “Science and Technology Project” is under way. 
This has been conducted every year since FY2010.79 In this project, 
NDL selects important topics from a variety of topics related to science 
and technology, looking forward several years into the future, and 
organizes a research committee consisting of external experts according 
to the topic, and the committee works on research and analysis in coop-
eration with an independent policy institute. 
Parallel to this, NDL researchers in sectors related to the topic gather 
within NDL in a cross-bureau manner to prepare a report based on field 
research, interviews, literature review and other undertakings. For those 
sectors and viewpoints requiring manpower in addition to the office 
researchers, experts from universities and the like are invited to serve as 
visiting researchers or part-time researchers and to conduct research. 
The topics so far are as shown in Table 1. 
                                                                    
79 The author took part in the activities of the Science and Technology Project for three 
years (FY2010-FY2012) as a visiting researcher. Since FY2013, he has worked for the 
NDL as a full-time senior specialist, supervising the Science and Technology Project. 
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The NDL is not a research institute like universities or national laborato-
ries. The task of its staff is to provide “information on science and 
technology” that can be used as reference for Parliament’s deliberations. 
The staff conducts research on technological issues, the present state of 
systems and regulations related to such issues, and trends in research 
activities and their future directions, and extracts the impact on future 
policies and the expected roles of the legislative bodies. 
Further, they organize the prospective impact on the economy and 
everyday life, future possibilities, the necessity of institutional and 
political responses, and so on. In doing so, they also scrutinize similar 
arguments in foreign countries. Thus, the team of the “Science and 
Technology Project” prepares unique reports that cover various issues 
from the basics of science and technology to politics and sociology. 
These reports differ not only from research papers or descriptions in the 
Table 1: List of topics of the Science and Technology Project, FY2010–2014 
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field of science and technology, but also from descriptions of laws and 
regulations or systems. 
Significance of NDL’s TA-like Activity 
The National Diet Library conducts TA-like research activities because 
much of Parliament’s deliberation on budgets and accounts and its legisla-
tive activity is naturally related to science and technology policies and the 
government’s research activities. This has long remained unchanged. 
However, the amount of legislation submitted by Parliament members80 
has recently increased. Table 2 shows examples of recent legislation 
related to science and technology at the instance of Parliament members. 
  
                                                                    
80 In legislative activities in Japan, bills are classified into three types according to the 
submitter: Cabinet bills (bills submitted by the Cabinet), Upper House bills (bills 
submitted by Upper Parliament members), and Lower House bills (bills submitted by 
Lower Parliament members). Among them, Lower House bills and Upper House bills 
are collectively called legislation by Parliament members. In Japan, Cabinet bills have 
traditionally represented the largest proportion. However, recent legislation by Par-
liament members has also been actively conducted. 
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Table 2: Examples of legislation related to science and technology at the  
instance of Parliament members 
 
Concerning newly emerging problems and cutting-edge science and 
technology, there are cases where it is uncertain which administrative 
body is responsible or multiple administrative bodies are involved, delay-
ing the start of legislation. If the legislative bodies are responsible, it is 
possible to promptly and flexibly pursue legislative activity from a broad 
viewpoint. Thus, the enactment of acts related to science and technology 
through legislation by members of Parliament is rational. However, it is 
necessary for the members to fully understand, discuss, and assess issues 
related to science and technology. Nevertheless, many members are 
unfamiliar with science and technology, and they do not easily keep up 
with recent trends even if they have expertise in some areas. 
If a member of Parliament does not have much information on matters 
under discussion that are related to science and technology, such as that 
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needed for making a decision, the service of the NDL that provides 
legislative information would be an effective tool. Researchers at the 
NDL commit themselves to organizing the necessary information and 
providing it in a well-balanced manner, including specialized infor-
mation such as research papers written by domestic and foreign scholars. 
The second significant fact is that science and technology has spread into 
every corner of modern society and our lives and that consequently there 
are a growing number of issues related to science and technology in 
parliamentary research and deliberation on national policies. In addition, 
public R&D funding has long been on the increase, and scientific and 
technological activities are supported by society and the government. 
Science and technology have now become inseparable from the nation 
and society, and vice versa. As a result, many policy issues have a 
connection in some form with science and technology. For example, the 
fact that the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation 
Commission (NAIIC) was established in the Parliament in order to 
conduct an investigation and make a recommendation for determining 
the cause of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant 
of Tokyo Electric Power Company on March 11, 2011, is still fresh in 
our memory. The NAIIC is said to be the “first independent investiga-
tive body for Japanese people that was established in the Parliament in 
the history of the Japanese constitutional government.” The Commit-
tee’s report, published in July, 2012, recommended that “A system for 
appointing independent investigation committees, including experts 
largely from the private sector, must be developed to deal with unre-
solved issues.”81 Although this recommendation has not been realized 
                                                                    
81 The National Diet of Japan, “Executive summary, Recommendation 7: Develop a 
system of independent investigation commissions,” The official report of The Fuku-
shima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, July 2012, p.23. 
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yet, it can be said that a system for assisting research and deliberation on 
national policy issues at the legislative body is now also required in 
various fields in Japan. 
The third item of significance is inextricably linked to the second point 
described above. It has become necessary for those involved in politics 
to have an interest in science and technology precisely because science 
and technology have now spread into society as well as the fact that the 
Parliament needs to make full and appropriate use of information re-
garding science and technology for national policy deliberations. 
It can be said that the development of today’s science and technology is 
supported not only by scholars but also by society, the economy, the 
population, and the Parliament. In addition, the whole of society has the 
responsibility to pass science and technology as a cultural asset on to the 
next generation, and the Parliament also bears part of this responsibility. 
Therefore, it is necessary to transmit not only the information provided 
by scientists and engineers, but also the opinions and attitudes of the 
business community, society, and the population on scientific and 
technological activities to the Parliament and its members in a smooth 
and well-balanced manner. 
Although TA activity at the NDL has just started, it can be said that the 
perspective described above is exactly the same as the significance of 
the presence of parliamentary TA in other countries. 
                                                                                                                                        
<http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/collections/NDL_WA_po_print/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naii
c.go.jp/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/NDL_WA_po_NAIIC_report_hi_res10.pdf> 
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Enhancing Relationship with other 
TA-like Activities in Japan 
NDL’s TA-like activities do not have a formal relationship with other 
TA-like activities in Japan due to the accounting system and other 
restrictions. However, the NDL is studying how it can have a collabora-
tive relationship with potential partners, and it is possible that there may 
be some form of collaboration with them in the future. 
To build collaboration with other TA-like activities in Japan, it is 
necessary to overcome major challenges. The most important one is 
that those in academic circles understand the characteristics of assis-
tance provided for legislation and its difference from assistance given 
to administrative bodies. 
In Japanese society, it is not uncommon for those in academic circles, 
including university scholars, to submit reports including recommenda-
tions from their professional viewpoints. However, it should be noted 
that most of these proposals are submitted to administrative bodies. In 
many cases, such proposals also contain recommendations concerning 
matters directly related to policies, such as what kinds of policies should 
be implemented and how policies should be changed. In quite a lot of 
cases, they also contain evidence that supports a certain policy. 
Reports submitted to the legislative bodies are prepared for members of 
Parliament, who represent the people, and are also open to the people, 
who had elected the Parliament. The legislative body is the place where 
the members of Parliament elected by the people conduct legislation. 
Reports submitted to the members of Parliament and the Houses must not 
be intended to urge a specific legislative act, but should definitely provide 
materials or evidence offering assistance for preparing legislation. Instead 
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of proposing policies themselves, these reports should mainly be analyses 
of the present issues, possible issues, and/or alternatives. 
Especially importantly is that proposals presented to the administrative 
body are allowed to contain particular content, but that reports intended 
to provide assistance for legislation are balanced information that 
contains a possible alternative policy or inconvenient evidence, not a 
particular policy or merely evidence that supports it. One of the im-
portant roles of the legislative bodies is administrative oversight. In that 
sense, the NDL is required to provide not only evidence supporting a 
certain policy but also inconvenient evidence in a well-balanced manner 
before the members of Parliament make their judgment. Therefore, the 
evidence provided to the legislative bodies in legislative information and 
based on expertise, has more significance than recommendations or 
reports presented to an administrative body. 
It used to be the case in Japanese society that an administrative body 
made all the decisions and pursued them. In such a society, academic 
circles found their significance in presenting proposals or conveying 
requests to the administrative body. 
However, in pursuing TA-like activities as a legislative assistant, not 
only the NDL but also its outside partners must radically change the 
framework of its approach from that taken in providing assistance to an 
administrative body. This will also provide an opportunity for academic 
circles and TA-like activities in Japan to change dramatically. Realizing 
close collaboration between the NDL’s TA-like activities and other TA-
like activities in Japan would also be of significance for other TA-like 
activities in Japan as a whole. 
Technology Assessment Activity 
179 
Conclusion 
Compared internationally, it can be said that the National Diet Library 
already has a function as a parliamentary TA organization in a substan-
tive sense. Its future task will be to heighten its recognition and presence 
by steadily increasing its experience and achievement and by earning the 
trust of all stakeholders for its function of providing assistance for 
legislation concerning science and technology in general. 
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The goal of technology assessment (TA) – which 
comprises one concept of interdisciplinary problem-
oriented research, policy consulting (such as parlia-
mentary TA), and public dialogue – is to lend support 
to society and policy making by promoting under-
standing of the problems related to the grand socio-
technical challenges of our time, as well as to assess 
the available options for managing them. Resear-
chers from Japan and Europe reflected together in 
this book on country-specific developments to iden-
tify the conditions that must be present to anchor TA 
in science, politics, and society. This book helps us 
to learn about different cultural conditions that have 
promoted the formation of a reflexive science.
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